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ASYLUM, SECURITY AND EXTREMISM
ABSTRACT 
This is the final of three Thematic Reports published as part of a CREST-funded project carried out by a team of 
researchers at City, University of London, and Cranfield University at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. 
With the objective of better understanding Tamil diaspora communities’ attitudes and engagement in the Sri Lankan 
civil conflict (1983-2009) and its aftermath, the project explores diaspora and refugee communities’ relationship with the 
changing socio-political environment in the homeland, exploring what shapes and influences processes of radicalisation 
or moderation among these communities. It recognises that the socio-political circumstances in which these processes 
develop are often crucial to understanding why a community or individuals within that community abroad act in a certain 
way; this includes analysis of different scales and levels of engagement, both in home and host countries, as well as 
different ‘areas’ of engagement, which can include social, economic and political interactions. 
The three thematic reports produced as part of this project cumulatively build a comprehensive picture of the state of 
knowledge on political action among diaspora, refugee and asylum populations. The theoretically-informed, literature- 
and evidence-grounded conclusions arising from these three thematic reports are therefore of relevance beyond the case 
of Sri Lanka. 
Thematic Report One discussed how four analytical concepts, diaspora, transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and 
translocalism, have come to frame the academic discussion on overseas politics and the potential of these concepts to 
shed light on the relationship between mobility and political action. Thematic Report Two complements the previous 
report’s broad conceptual discussion by specifically focusing on an analysis of the context and drivers of political action 
among diaspora and refugee populations, and engaging with the term ‘refugee politics’. The current paper – the final 
Thematic Report – analyses the growing ‘securitisation’ of refugees and other forcibly displaced populations and calls 
for greater consideration of structural vulnerabilities in the forced migration and displacement cycle that increase the risk 
of radicalisation, extremism and related political behaviours.
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INTRODUCTION
The forced displacement and cross-border onward migration of people as a result of conflict and generalised instability 
inevitably raises security concerns for states. The loss of control of borders in mass influxes is seen as a potential threat 
to national security, and the protracted presence of refugees on another’s sovereign territory can undermine relations 
with neighbouring states and negatively affect regional stability. Indeed, the decision of states to push refugees across 
their borders has the implicit intent of generating such insecurity, as does the deliberate destabilisation of camps and the 
militarisation of a camp’s population as a means to further conflict. The economic costs of hosting refugee populations, 
in the absence of adequate international financial support, challenges national development plans with host populations 
concerned about the diversion of limited resources and competition for land, jobs, healthcare and education opportunities. 
Large scale refugee flows are also seen by some states as a threat to national identity where it is argued that cultural and 
religious differences cannot easily be reconciled in a context where a government loses control over the scale and pace 
of entry or the means to return unrecognised refugees to their country of origin. 
At the same time, and specifically in response to refugee and migration flows from the Middle East over the past two 
years, some states, both in Europe and the region, while conscious of security issues, have opened their borders to people 
fleeing conflict, and others have for the first time participated in global protection initiatives such as Third Country 
Resettlement. Beyond their international legal obligations and a stated humanitarian commitment to contribute to ‘burden 
sharing’ in refugee responses (both European and global), countries see benefits and opportunities in accepting refugees 
as long term citizens playing an important economic and social role in the development of the nation and its projection 
as a responsible global partner.
Over the past decade, however, and coinciding with the rise of transnational jihadism, territorial and societal security 
concerns about refugee flows and asylum-migration have been joined by more direct and immediate fears about the 
relationship between displacement, onward migration, the entry and settlement of refugees, and terrorism. Parts of the 
United Nations, civil society and human rights organisations reject the notion that migration can be associated with an 
increased terrorism threat, arguing that refugees and other migrants are victims of violence rather than perpetrators (Koser 
and Cunningham 2017: 209 – see also Neumann 2017), and that the global failure to address the exploitation of migrants 
and root causes of migration should instead be the main concern and priority of states. The UN Special Rapporteur 
on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights concluded in a 2016 report that ‘there is no evidence that migration leads to 
increased terrorist activity’ (cited in Crone  2017: 14), a message further reinforced in recent research undertaken by the 
Special Representative on Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism during Austria’s 2017 OSCE Chairmanship 
(Neumann 2017: 25). 
However, the principal concerns expressed by security organisations such as Europol (2016 – cited in Crisp 2017; Crone 
2017) and the German Federal Ministry for the Interior (2016), and drawing on Syrian migration in 2015 and 2016, are 
that agents of international jihadist groups have shown a capacity to recruit among displaced Syrians in the region, in 
transit and settlement, and that terrorists (including children as ‘sleepers’) were concealed among refugees and prepared 
to take part in terrorist attacks at some later date. President Trump has been exceptional among Western leaders in 
arguing that a link, albeit of undefined causality, exists between migration and terrorism on US soil (US Department of 
Homeland Security 2018), and the policy response has included a scaling back of the US refugee resettlement programme 
(as other countries in Europe and Canada have expanded their programmes), a temporary ban on entry into the US from 
certain Muslim majority states (a policy that has not been replicated elsewhere), and a further review of the humanitarian 
visa programme. 
Media reporting of terrorist attacks and legal proceedings (see Annex A) now routinely report the migration or refugee 
profile of those implicated in or charged over attacks and such reporting will inevitably influence public perceptions of 
refugees, asylum-seekers and any threats they are seen to pose. A Pew poll in 2016 reported that across ten EU countries 
included in the study, 59 percent of respondents voiced concern about the prospect of increased terrorism in relation to 
the influx of refugees in 2015-2016 while a further 50 percent worried about the economic burden of hosting refugees, 
fearing the loss of jobs and social benefits (Wike, Stokes and Simmons 2016).
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This Thematic Report critically reviews the current academic state of knowledge on refugee movements and the security 
threat nexus. Drawing on the two previous Thematic Reports in this series it seeks to better understand why forced 
displacement, onward migration and refugee settlement in countries of asylum is increasingly linked to the threat of 
political extremism and terrorism. It builds on the discussion in Thematic Report Two on the nature of refugee politics 
and what shapes individual’s political commitments to conflict at ‘home’ and what factors shape forms of political 
engagement internationally. It extends this discussion by considering the pathways through which engagement in diaspora 
politics could take an extreme form, including support for the use of violence. 
Through an examination of the literature on critical security studies, and in particular ‘securitisation’, the Thematic 
Report traces the process by which ‘the refugee’ is constructed as a threat, how that threat is understood by the 
state and by society more broadly, and how the evolution, dissemination and consumption of the ‘threat’ comes 
to inform policy-makers and the policy-making process. And, finally, the Report reviews the radicalisation 
literature in relation to the known experiences of refugees throughout the forced displacement cycle as they 
seek to move from a place of danger to a place of safety. It is shown that at various points on the cycle individuals 
confront situations that open doors to those who would seek to recruit and radicalise them, who may be drawn to 
extremist narratives, or who become dependent upon those who have the resources to provide routes out of danger. 
The three thematic reports in this series 
are:
1. Understanding Transnational Diaspora 
Politics: A Conceptual Discussion
2. The Engagement of Refugees in 
Transnational Politics: Lessons from 
the Migration, Diaspora and Refugee 
Studies Literature
3. Asylum, Security and Extremism
These reports are available to download 
from the CREST website:  
www.crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/
extremism-to-moderate-politics/
Thematic Report Three
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1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND 
SECURITY: LESSONS FROM THE 
DIASPORA STUDIES LITERATURE
1  Thematic Reports One and Two provide a more detailed analysis of  this literature.
While Thematic Reports One and Two provided a 
detailed analysis of the rationales and modus operandi 
of diasporic communities, they also concluded – 
among other things – that Diaspora Studies has 
predominantly focused on the ways in which diaspora 
politics negatively affect conflicts in the homeland. 
Authors have argued that diasporas are in effect ‘peace-
wrecking’ actors – to use the terminology employed by 
Smith and Stares (2007) – sustaining conflicts from 
afar by providing economic and human capital to 
advance a particular and typically nationalistic cause. 
This image of ‘diaspora as insecurity’ can be found 
in influential econometric research by Paul Collier 
and Anke Hoeffler that seeks to understand how civil 
wars are initiated and renewed. The authors argue that 
while the size of the diaspora is not directly related 
to the start of conflict, ‘a large diaspora considerably 
increases the risk of repeat conflict’ (2004: 575). This 
necessarily implies that ‘diasporas’ are inherently 
connected to security concerns; an implication that has 
been problematised by Nathan (2008: 266) who argues 
that such a view is based on ‘a positive correlation … 
[in Collier and Hoeffler’s study] … between renewed 
civil war and the proportion of a country’s population 
living as emigrants in the US’, which might be an 
exceptional case.
McGregor and Pasura’s research on African diasporas’ 
engagement with episodes of crisis and instability in the 
homeland points to the influence that global security 
concerns are playing in framing debates over ‘conflict-
generated diasporas’, leading to at best ‘simplistic’ and at 
worst ‘dangerously misleading narratives about Islamic 
violence in Africa’ (Dowd and Raleigh 2013, cited in 
McGregor and Pasura 2014: 4). Although the literature 
on the potential ‘peace-making’ role of diasporas allows 
us to move beyond the limiting account of these groups 
as violent-prone entities, McGregor and Pasura (2014: 
4) do caution against ‘the risk of replacing one over-
simplified framing with another’.1 Referring specifically 
to the often-celebratory tone of much writing about 
diasporas and development, these authors point out 
that ‘transnational connections and engagements, 
even if philanthropic or developmental in intent, are 
much more multi-faceted, fraught and conflictual 
than the development literature conveys’ (McGregor 
and Pasura 2014: 5). While Lyons (2007: 529) argues 
that conflict-generated diasporas are less likely ‘to be 
willing to compromise and therefore reinforce and 
exacerbate the protractedness of homeland conflicts’, 
Al-Ali, Black and Koser (2001: 626) suggest that if 
an individual opposes the government in the home 
country, which one could argue might have contributed 
to his/her displaced status, ‘he or she may choose not 
to contribute [to national reconstruction] despite being 
able to afford to’. This inconclusive picture resonates 
with Brubaker's (2005) criticism of the tendency to 
understand diasporas as homogeneous entities with 
similar goals and methods of action.
More recent research is focusing on how ‘conflict-
generated diasporas’ evolve over time and through 
the ‘life-cycle’ of migration (Betts and Jones 2016; 
Koinova 2016; Sökefeld 2006). While this research 
contributes to our understanding of the ways in which 
diaspora groups mobilise (also in conflictual ways), 
there is insufficient critical and theoretical reflection 
on when and how the actions of such groups might 
constitute a security problem. Moreover, despite the 
focus on identity-formation and group organisation, 
there is limited thought on how displacement and the 
experience of conflict and asylum affects behaviour and 
what are likely to be the resulting security implications, 
if any. An exception is provided by Koinova (2016), 
From the Diasporisation to the Transnationalisation of Exile Politics – The Case of Sri Lanka, 1983-2016
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who, by focusing on the specific experience of 
Bosnian refugees in the Netherlands, observes that 
both displacement and the host country response to 
such phenomenon were crucial in defining diasporic 
political activism. Elsewhere, Demmers (2007) studies 
changes in the nature of war and the emergence of 
identity-based security issues as drivers for diasporic 
activism, effectively providing a bridge between the 
Diaspora Studies and the Security Studies literatures. 
Her study considers the impact that the ‘War on Terror 
paradigm’ has had on framing diaspora politics; ‘a 
large share of diasporic politics today is dedicated to 
fighting a discursive battle over image, the justification 
of violence, and political legitimacy, passionately 
countering and contesting terrorist labelling’ (Demmers 
2007: 24).
The post-Cold War expansion in the meaning of the 
concept of security is central to the discussion on 
the so called ‘securitisation’ of forced displacement 
and asylum. The following section maps out the 
contribution the Security Studies literature makes to our 
understanding of how discursively, and in policy terms 
migration, asylum and displacement have increasingly 
come to be seen as a threat.
Thematic Report Three
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2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND 
SECURITY: LESSONS FROM THE 
SECURITY STUDIES LITERATURE
2  This report is going to focus largely on the contribution of  the Copenhagen School of  Security Studies, through theorists such as 
Buzan, de Wilde, and Wæver.
The literature on the relationship between displacement 
and security can broadly be organised in two ways: 
first, there is the traditional perspective of migration as 
a threat to the security of the state, and second, analysis 
that is centred on a ‘critical’ observation of the figure 
of the migrant and threats to economic, societal and 
cultural forms of security. Huysmans and Squire (2009: 
170 – emphasis added) argue that ‘both Migration 
Studies and Security Studies tend to approach issues 
related to the migration-security nexus in traditional 
terms by conceptualising security as a value to be 
achieved’, generally taking the state as the main unit 
of analysis towards which external threats, largely 
of a military nature, are directed. However, scholars 
within the realm of critical security studies have sought 
to bypass these conceptions, both by understanding 
security as a social construction (Bigo 2002, 2014; 
Buzan and Waever 1997; Huysmans 2006), and by 
focusing instead on the figure of the migrant (Gerard 
and Pickering 2014; Innes 2014; Millner 2011).2
Before this review addresses these schools of thought, 
some preliminary reflections can be made. First, 
focusing only on a state-level analysis could simplify 
how forced migration is understood, treating it as a 
static concept as instances of insecurity are generally 
analysed at the border, and as such tend to miss out 
on experiences of prior displacement, asylum-seeking, 
integration and potential return. Equally, when focusing 
on the figure of the migrant we should not diminish the 
role that the state plays as a security actor through a 
number of tools, including through the use of migration 
(Betts 2009; Weiner 1992; Loescher and Milner 2005, 
2011).
Second, despite neo-realist opposition to the expansion 
of the concept of security to include non-military 
threats, Betts (2009: 62) considers that ‘much of 
the literature on the relationship between forced 
migration and security (and much policy-making on 
immigration and asylum) implicitly adopts elements 
of a TSS [traditional security studies] approach’. In 
fact, objections have been raised to the extent to which 
early critical security scholars such as Buzan or Waever 
effectively challenged the nature of security as entailing 
a tangible, achievable status (McSweeny 1996). 
Without engaging in a detailed theoretical discussion, 
what is important here is that there are question marks 
over the capacity of at least some elements of critical 
security studies to break completely from traditional 
approaches to security.
Finally, the Security Studies literature has been shaped 
both by ‘changes in the nature of migration and in 
the nature of thinking about migration’ (Huysmans 
and Squire 2009: 169). Traditionally the literature 
has referred to the ‘migration-security nexus’, where 
irregular migrants, asylum-seekers, labour migrants 
and refugees are often merged under the same label. 
An emerging literature is however focusing specifically 
on irregular migration, asylum-seeking and refugees in 
relation to security through the term ‘asylum-security 
nexus’ (see for example Avdan 2014; Bigo 2014; 
Feller 2005, 2006; Gibney 2004; Hammerstadt 2014). 
Although the latter term better reflects the interests of 
this CREST-funded project, the thematic report will 
use both terms when analysing the literature.
From the Diasporisation to the Transnationalisation of Exile Politics – The Case of Sri Lanka, 1983-2016
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2.1 TRADITIONAL SECURITY 
APPROACHES TO MIGRATION 
AND ASYLUM
Weiner advocates the use of a ‘security/stability 
framework’ for the study of international migration 
that ‘consider[s] political changes within states as a 
major determinant of international population flows, 
and migration, including refugee flows, both as a cause 
and a consequence of international conflict’ (1992: 95). 
Specifically, in relation to three distinct types of ‘forced 
and induced emigration’ which states use to pursue 
strategic objectives, forced emigration is presented as 
a way for states to achieve cultural homogeneity or as 
way to assert dominance over a minority; to deal with 
political dissidents and class enemies; and to achieve 
foreign policy objectives (Weiner 1992: 100). Weiner 
comments:
To view refugee flows as simply the unintended 
consequence of internal upheavals or 
economic crises is to ignore the eagerness 
of some governments to reduce or eliminate 
from within their own borders selected social 
classes and ethnic groups, and to affect the 
politics and policies of their neighbours 
(1992: 103).
Weiner’s approach is useful not only because of its 
influence in subsequent research, but also because 
it questions traditional frameworks of analysis that 
understand migration as the direct consequence of 
economic imbalances, instead establishing a relational 
link between forced migration and security.
Building on Weiner’s work, Loescher and Milner 
(2005: 24) observe how during the Cold War, ‘forced 
migration constituted one of the central concerns of 
US and Western foreign policies [as] refugees were 
seen as part of the struggle between East and West’. 
Watson (2009: 17) adds support to this argument when 
interpreting displacement movements during the Cold 
War era as ‘part of a larger security agenda associated 
with the victory of the capitalist “West” […] these cases 
demonstrate that migration has and can be constructed 
in various ways, indeed as a source of security rather 
than insecurity’. 
In the early 1990s, the migration-‘high politics’ 
nexus was also the dominant framework not only to 
understand some of the early post-Cold War academic 
writings on migration and security, as Loescher and 
Milner (2005: Chapter 2) describe, but also to explain 
political developments in security for a such as the UN 
and NATO, and in foreign policy debates around issues 
of regional economic and political integration (Martin 
2001). Having said that Newland (1995) argues that 
the Cold War geographical and ideological grounds 
for granting refugee status were not at the forefront of 
US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Rather the 
emphasis was on the use of foreign policy to prevent, 
respond, control or stop refugee flows into the US or 
into regional areas of interest to US foreign policy, with 
examples including the refugee crises in Northern Iraq 
in 1991, Rwanda in 1994 as well as US policies towards 
Cuba and Haiti.
In their analysis, Loescher and Milner acknowledge 
that, while forced migration was a ‘central concern of 
US and Western foreign policies’ (2005: 24), with the 
exception of specific refugee groups that were perceived 
as assets or liabilities in specific crises, ‘the logic of the 
Cold War was bound by a highly constrained notion 
of security which did not see migration as a central 
issue’ (2005: 24). This understanding of security was 
based on two premises: that most state threats came 
from outside its borders, and that while they were 
‘primarily but not exclusively’ of a military nature, they 
required a political response (2005: 24). Loescher and 
Milner also argue that after the end of the Cold War ‘it 
became clear that refugee movements were not only a 
consequence of insecurity, but could also be a cause 
of instability, for host states, for countries of origin, 
in conflict and even a threat to wider international 
peace and security’ (Loescher and Milner 2005: 24-
25). Other scholars, however, have taken a different 
approach, as illustrated by Watson’s (2006: 66) analysis 
of the writings of Waever (1995). The latter author has 
argued that the role that migration played in national 
security agendas during the Cold War was contextual, 
varying in importance between East and West based on 
the different levels of internal cohesion and legitimacy 
of the two political and ideological regimes.
Weiner is critical of the migration and security 
literature from the early 1990s arguing that ‘little 
systematic comparative attention has been given to the 
ways in which international population movements 
create conflicts within and between states’ (1992: 94). 
Newland (1995) and Salehyan (2007) address this 
weakness by considering the role that military action, 
such as the US in Haiti in 1994 or NATO in Kosovo 
in 1999, as well as ground interventions in Africa or 
Asia, played in an attempt by more powerful countries 
to limit further displacement and onward movement. 
Thematic Report Three
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According to Salehyan, ‘refugee flows between 
states may significantly increase the likelihood of 
militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) […] Refugee-
receiving states are more likely to initiate MIDs as 
they intervene to prevent further externalities, and 
refugee-sending states initiate MIDs as they violate 
borders in pursuit of dissidents' (2007: 1). The large-N 
quantitative analysis carried out by this author covering 
the period between 1955-2000 proposes therefore that 
refugees are a key variable in triggering conflicts, in 
which both sending and receiving states are involved. 
Milner (2009) addresses these issues from a political 
theory perspective, suggesting that mass arrivals and 
protracted refugee situations might be perceived by 
those countries within the region of origin of forced 
displacement – which often suffer from fragile and weak 
political structures – as a threat to their sovereignty, 
as they limit the ability of the country to control its 
own borders and achieve its international and domestic 
political objectives, therefore connecting to Salehyan’s 
argument that this could lead to inter-state disputes.
More recent work by Salehyan together with Choi 
(2013) shifts the focus from military action and 
conflict to the consequences of hosting refugees for 
international and domestic terrorism. On the basis 
of a cross-national, time-series data analysis of 154 
countries between 1970–2007, the authors suggest that 
the ‘greed’ literature has not taken into account the effect 
that the influx of humanitarian aid and the presence of 
humanitarian workers that accompany refugee crises 
can have in providing incentives for terrorist attacks. 
As Choi and Salehyan (2013: 57) explain:
aid resources, particularly in violent 
contexts, are often another prime target for 
theft and provide an easy opportunity for 
militants to acquire resources […] and the 
abduction of aid workers for ransom […] 
humanitarian workers may also become a 
target because of their ethnicity, nationality, 
or religion. Rather than travelling abroad 
to conduct attacks in their selected country, 
extremists can choose to target expatriates 
in their midst.
Choi and Salehyan (2007) complement Stedman and 
Tanner (2003)’s arguments around the manipulation of 
refugee flows and refugee camps by warrying factions 
to attract and use humanitarian aid to support the 
continuation of warfare. At the same time, in common 
with the rest of the literature presented in this section, 
Choi and Salehyan treat refugees as a tool used by 
security actors, whereby they are a means to an end 
rather than actors in themselves.
In a different context, Loescher and Milner (2004, 2005, 
2011) analyse how inter-state dynamics can generate 
‘protracted refugee situations’, whereby various peace 
and security actors fail to engage with the causes of 
forced displacement. The reasons for such a lack of 
engagement should be sought also in relation to security, 
as both sending and receiving states make their political 
action contingent on socio-political decisions that 
could affect their security both directly and indirectly. 
Examples of these are Macedonia’s reluctance to accept 
Kosovar Albanian refugees in 1999, as they were seen 
as a potential threat to Macedonia’s ethnic balance, or 
Iraqi Kurds in Turkey (Loescher and Milner 2005: 33). 
While the significance of protracted refugee situations 
from a security point of view has been addressed in 
the literature, Loescher and Milner (2004) underline 
the existing emphasis on the security needs of Western 
states at the expense of refugee-hosting states within 
the region of origin, where scarcity of resources, 
political fragility, lack of governance and sovereignty 
concerns exacerbate the security spill-overs from the 
militarisation of camps and refugee competition with 
the host population.
The preoccupation of traditional approaches with 
external, military threats reinvigorates an important 
dimension in the study of the relationship between 
forced displacement and security that tends to be 
sidelined vis-à-vis other migration-related matters, 
which at the time of writing, generate more political 
and public debate, at least in Western societies, such 
as identity, belonging and integration. A limitation 
of traditional approaches, however, is that migration 
flows, and especially forced displacement, are treated 
as an instrumental tool in the hands of states, thereby 
neglecting the agency of the displaced in influencing 
security ‘calculations’. In addition, focusing on the 
state level means important migration-related dynamics 
within states are not considered. As Weiner (1992: 
103) observes when discussing migration as a security 
problem, ‘the threat can be an attack by armed refugees; 
migrants can be a threat to either country’s political 
stability; or migrants can be perceived as a threat to 
the major societal values of the receiving country’. 
Focusing on the migration/asylum-security nexus 
necessarily requires going beyond the state-level of 
analysis and understanding implications at the societal 
level, which allows us to take into consideration non-
military conceptualisations of security.
From the Diasporisation to the Transnationalisation of Exile Politics – The Case of Sri Lanka, 1983-2016
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2.2 CRITICAL SECURITY 
STUDIES, MIGRATION AND 
ASYLUM
Dating from the mid-1990s, critical security studies is 
best described as an ‘orientation towards the discipline 
[of security studies] than a precise theoretical label’ 
(Krause and Williams 1997: xii) that has the aim of 
expanding the study of security by moving it away 
from ‘the state-centric militarism of the traditional 
orthodoxy’ (Vaughan-Williams and Peoples 2010: 5). 
Scholars within critical security studies have sought to 
‘deepen’ the security agenda by going beyond the state 
as the only referent object; ‘broaden’ security thinking 
by incorporating various areas that were previously 
neglected, such as the environment, migration or 
the economy; and challenge the nature of security as 
something that exists as an objective reality, rather 
arguing that security is something that is constructed 
(Krause and Williams 1996; Buzan 1991; Buzan, 
Waever and Wilde 1998; Waever 1995). 
The Copenhagen School, a school of thought within 
critical security studies, has added to debates on what 
the referent object of security is and the implications this 
may have for non-traditional security issues, but also 
to discussions on how something becomes a security 
issue. These two main contributions will be explored 
by focusing on the notions of ‘societal security’ and 
‘securitisation’, both relevant to this review of the 
literature on migration and security.
In the second edition of the book People, States and 
Fear, Buzan argues that, although the understanding 
of security as state-level and preoccupied with the 
military and political sectors remains ‘particularly 
central’ (1991: 1), it cannot be fully comprehended 
without taking into account other levels of analysis – 
individual, regional, system/international – and sector 
areas – economic, environmental, societal – that are 
intrinsic to the field of International Studies. In his own 
words, ‘a full understanding of each can only be gained 
if it is related to the others. Attempts to treat security as 
if it was confined to any single level or any single sector 
invite serious distortions of understanding’ (Buzan 
1991: 363). 
Notwithstanding the holistic approach that Buzan’s 
ideas invite us to take, when analysing the migration/
asylum-security nexus the concept of ‘societal security’ 
or ‘societal threats’ has become particularly influential. 
Society is understood here as entailing ‘identity, the 
self-conception of communities, and those individuals 
who identify themselves as members of a particular 
community’ (Waever 1995: 66-67 - emphasis in 
original; Waever  1993). Waever argues that while 
security is necessarily associated to the state as a 
referent object, security should be reconceptualised 
‘in terms of a duality of state security and societal 
security. State security has sovereignty as its ultimate 
criterion, and societal security has identity’ (1995: 67 
- emphasis in original). Societal security therefore has 
to be understood as when ‘significant groups within a 
society feel threatened, feel their identity is endangered 
by immigration, integration or cultural imperialism, 
and try to defend themselves’ (Waever 1995: 67). It 
reflects the ‘ability of a society to persist in its essential 
character under changing conditions’ (Waever  1993: 
23 - emphasis in original).
McSweeney is critical of the Copenhagen School 
approach in the way that it reifies ‘identity’ and 
‘security’ by understanding them as something existing 
a priori and reducing ‘our conception of society 
to its most ephemeral and empirically contentious 
component’ when in fact societal groups face a 
‘multi-dimensionality of threats’ (1996: 85). Such 
criticism has not stopped the proliferation of studies 
on concepts of identity, belonging, and the extent to 
which ‘foreigners’ constitute a potential threat to the 
‘way of being’ of a society (Diez and Squire 2008; 
Huysmans 2000, 2006; Kaya 2012). This literature is 
often connected with the radicalisation literature (Abdi 
2015; Rahimi and Graumans 2015), but even more 
increasingly to the extent to which such a broadening 
of what counts as security has influenced control 
and border management policies, especially within 
Western, liberal democracies (Boswell 2007; Den Boer 
and Monar 2002; Geddes 2005; Hyndman and Mountz 
2008; Huysmans and Buonfino 2008; Leonard 2010; 
Slominski and Trauner 2017). 
Sociological literature on group-threat theories, 
while not necessarily embedded on security studies 
frameworks of analysis, attempt to deconstruct how 
‘foreigners’ present a societal threat by focusing on 
the effect the actual versus the perceived size of 
that population as well as temporal dynamics (i.e., 
the duration of stay of those populations) have on 
determining the level of (perceived) danger by receiving 
societies (DeWaard 2015; Hjerm 2007; Pettigrew, 
Wagner and Christ 2010; Zorlu 2016). While empirical 
research on security-related issues implicitly shed 
light on the perceived fears of the hosting population 
towards foreigners, they also often fail to distinguish 
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different displacement phenomena which might enrich 
the discussion.
A cornerstone of this relatively recent approach to 
understanding ‘security among the people’ is the 
notion of ‘securitisation’, originally coined by Waever 
(1995). It refers to the process by which an issue 
is moved from the realm of politics (in the public 
domain) to the realm of security by framing it as an 
‘existential threat’, thus justifying the implementation 
of ‘extraordinary’ policies to address that threat, which 
may not otherwise have been acceptable to the general 
population. In other words, ‘security is not just a value 
or a condition but a specific way of dealing with an 
issue’ (Trombetta 2014: 132). This concept is based on 
the premise that security is a social construct through 
which the state and its elites define ‘existential threats’ 
in order to prioritise specific policy actions (Buzan, 
Waever and Wilde 1998). Waever explains clearly how 
securitisation works:
With the help of language theory, we can 
regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this 
usage, security is not of interest as a sign 
that refers to something more real; the 
utterance itself is the act. By saying it, 
something is done (as in betting, giving 
a promise, naming a ship). By uttering 
‘security’, a state-representative moves a 
particular development into a specific area, 
and thereby claims a special right to use 
whatever means are necessary to block it  
(Waever 1995: 55).
Doty (1998: 73) suggests that the Copenhagen School’s 
focus on the speech act and the discursive process 
‘limit[s] our understanding of securitisation to an 
instrumental process that is controlled by elites and 
power holders’ when in fact it can also be a bottom-
up driven approach, i.e., originating ‘from the masses’. 
Other scholars, mostly influenced by the Foucauldian 
approach to biopolitics (Huysmans 2006; Bigo 2002; 
Leonard 2010), have also questioned the approach 
arguing that ‘the practical work, discipline and 
expertise are as important as all forms of discourse’ 
(Bigo 2000: 194). This strongly resonates with Weiner, 
who contends that the understanding of migration and 
asylum as a threat lies not only in the perceptive and 
discursive dimension, but also in the practical political 
domain:
The highly conflictual nature of population 
movements has affected which institutions 
make exit and entry rules…[engaging] the 
foreign and defence ministries, the security 
and intelligence agencies, and [the] heads 
of government…the very form and intensity 
of response to unwanted migrations is itself 
an indication that such population flows are 
regarded as threats to security or stability 
(Weiner 1992: 125)
Trombetta (2014: 133) seeks a bridge between the 
discourse versus practice divide in arguing that ‘to 
some extent, they can be seen as complementary: 
security is not only about exceptional measures but 
also about the perpetration of practices…that makes 
security measures operable and normal’.
Debates on the multifaceted nature of securitisation 
have been further extended by the research of authors 
such as Hammerstadt (2014) who suggests that there is 
a third ‘securitisation school’ focusing on an ‘inclusive 
approach’ that refers to human or common security and 
that it is sharply in contrast with solely discursive or 
practice-oriented approaches. In the same vein, Doty 
(1998) analyses three ‘modes’ of securitisation of 
migration which shed light on different processes and 
potential dimensions to the asylum-security nexus: the 
national security mode, the societal security mode and 
the human security mode. The latter concept refers to 
‘people-centred’ approaches to security (MacFarlane 
2004) and has been used to explore the impact of 
securitising discourses and practices on the well-being 
of migrants and asylum-seekers (Feller 2006; Gerard 
and Pickering 2014; Innes 2014; Seidman-Zager 2010; 
Truong and Gasper 2011).
In the following sections the theoretical concepts already 
introduced will be applied to migration and asylum 
debates in order to provide answers to the questions 
of why and how forced displacement is increasingly 
considered in security terms, and the implications for 
forcibly displaced populations.
2.3 SECURITISATION: SPEECH 
ACTS AND PRACTICES
The migration/asylum-security nexus captures concerns 
that ‘large scale arrivals are seen as a threat to political, 
economic or social stability and tend increasingly to 
provoke hostility and violence’ (Feller 2006: 513-514). 
As Guiraudon and Joppke (2001: 15) suggest, ‘there is a 
simple reason for linking migration and security: to the 
From the Diasporisation to the Transnationalisation of Exile Politics – The Case of Sri Lanka, 1983-2016
14
Lessons from the Security Studies Literature
degree that immigration is unwanted, and immigration 
policy becomes “control” policy, immigration is likely 
to be addressed in negative terms, as a “threat” to the 
receiving society’. The authors provide an analysis 
that focuses on the ‘constructedness’ of migration as a 
political and security process taking place at European 
(Kosolwski 2001), national (Bigo 2001) and local 
levels (Quassoli 2001). While Guiraudon and Joppke 
focus largely on how migration policy is developed, 
they also briefly engage with ‘how much of a security 
threat immigrants actually are’, arguing that because 
migration policies have become more restrictive, 
there has been a shift from demand to supply-driven 
immigration, higher levels of irregular immigration and 
more risk-taking and law-violating behaviours among 
those that still consider migration despite increased 
state restrictions. These authors therefore conclude, ‘the 
proportion of irregular immigrants – asylum-seekers, 
tourists, illegals, and transitory migrants – among 
criminal immigrants is exceedingly high everywhere’ 
(2001: 17). 
Having said that, Guiraudon and Joppke caution against 
conflating the category of ‘criminal transients’ with the 
majority of ‘law-abiding resident foreigners’, a practice 
that they describe as ‘politically convenient, but at best a 
half-truth’ (2001: 17). While these authors identify that 
second-generation migrants are more prone to conflict 
and crime, allegedly because of failing integration 
policies, their analysis nonetheless falls short of 
identifying how different displacement phenomena 
are considered within such securitised frameworks, 
therefore contributing to the conflation of migration 
and asylum-security nexa within academic debates. 
This is important when considering that, for example, 
the radicalisation literature sees restrictive integration 
or refugee policies as drivers of radicalisation (Abdi 
2015), although the securitisation literature is much 
more limited in understanding how security-influenced 
policies have affected the political behaviour of refugees 
and other forcibly displaced populations.
 The securitisation process is understood to contribute 
to ‘creat[ing] or reinforc[ing] divisions between “us” 
and “them”, using the enemy “other” on the outside as 
a tool for strengthening the community bonds between 
insiders’ (Hammerstadt 2014: 267-268), particularly 
3  It is especially in relation to this point that one is reminded of  Bigo (2002)’s argument that ‘international’ and ‘internal’ security are 
converging. If  we include the notion of  societal security, and therefore of  ‘identity’, in the realm of  internal security, we can understand how the 
protection of  democratic and Western principles becomes a matter of  ‘national security’ against external threats.
within Western liberal democracies (Bigo 2001; Diez 
and Squire 2008; Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017; 
Stokes-Dupass 2017)3. 
Studies have shown how political debate, media and the 
rise of right-wing parties in the West have contributed 
to the wide acceptance of the notion of the ‘outside 
threat’, which has found its way into international 
policy statements such UN and NATO declarations 
(Bigo 2001; Feller 2006), parliamentary discussions 
(Huysmans and Buonfino 2008). Such arguments have 
also been used to justify policies that advocate more 
restrictive and controlling migration regimes (Bigo 
2001, 2014; Geddes 2005; Huysmans and Buonfino 
2008; Watson 2009, among others). As Huysmans 
observes, ‘the political process of connecting migration 
to criminal and terrorist abuses…does not take place 
in isolation [but i]t is related to a wider politicisation 
in which immigrants and asylum-seekers are portrayed 
as a challenge to the protection of national identity and 
welfare provisions’ (2000: 751). 
Huysmans was among the first that sought to provide 
a comprehensive analysis of why and how ‘directly 
or indirectly, supporting strategies of securitisation 
makes the inclusion of immigrants, asylum-seekers 
and refugees in European societies more difficult’ 
(2000: 753). By providing various steps in the ‘The 
Europeanisation’ (and hence, securitisation) of 
migration policy aimed at creating a borderless internal 
Europe, Huysmans demonstrates that migration has 
become a ‘meta-issue’ in the political sphere which 
encompasses and relates to various economic, societal, 
and cultural dynamics, in his own words:
Construction of the internal security 
field, the restrictive migration policy, the 
privileging of nationals of Member States 
in the internal market, and the policies 
supporting, often indirectly, expressions of 
welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural 
homogeneity as a stabilising factor feed into 
the negative politicisation of immigrants, 
asylum-seekers and refugees as an 
illegitimate presence and scapegoat  
(Huysmans 2000: 770).
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These political dynamics are not restricted to the 
European experience as the global migration challenge 
confronts fundamental political ideas underpinning 
Western states (Huysmans 2000). Huysmans (1995, 
2006) observes that the process by which ‘us and them’ 
is defined contributes to a generalisation of migration 
movements as equally undermining the ‘survival of the 
political community’, therefore also questioning the 
traditional notions of memberships identified by the 
‘politics of belonging’:
So, the image seems to be not only one 
of insecure individuals threatened by 
‘foreigners’ but also one of an insecure 
collective identity which unites the insecure 
individuals. Slogans such as ‘we Austrians’, 
‘we Flemish’, ‘own people first’, etc. express 
this collective dimension  
(Huysmans 1995: 53).
This in turn resonates with discussions on radicalisation 
which will be analysed later in this review, and in 
particular the extent to which the political behaviour 
of migrants, refugees and especially second-generation 
individuals may be determined by the uncertainties of 
‘non-belonging’.
Influenced by the approach of the Copenhagen School, 
Bigo agrees that securitisation processes are not 
‘spontaneous’ (2002: 72), however, he argues that ‘it is 
possible to securitise certain problems without speech 
or discourse’ (2000: 194). Rather than implementing 
‘exceptional measures’, through day-to-day practices 
and routines such as visa controls, profiling and border 
checking, security agencies are seen to reinforce 
the understanding that immigrants are threats. For 
Bigo (2002: 66) the securitisation of migration is ‘a 
transversal political technology, used as a mode of 
governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the 
unease […] so as to affirm their role as providers of 
protection and security’.
Waever’s conceptualisation of the ‘speech act’ and 
Bigo’s focus on practices of securitisation have led 
others (Leonard 2010; Geddes 2015; Watson 2006, 
2009; to name a few) to analyse how migration and 
asylum policy has been influenced by such processes, 
and how migration and forced displacement is 
4  Now the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.
increasingly governed from a distance. An example 
of this is the debate in the literature on whether the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX)4, 
established in 2004, can be considered an example of 
extraordinary measures as part of the securitisation of 
migration and asylum in EU discourses and policy (see 
Leonard 2010; Mass and Truong 2011; Neal 2009).
Both ‘speech acts’ and practices of security agencies 
and other political actors offer useful insights in to the 
active role that state-level authorities, institutions and 
other elites play in the generation and reproduction 
of securitising dynamics. However, there are also 
limitations, they neglect the agency of immigrants, 
asylum-seekers or refugees in dealing with securitised 
policies, such as focusing on how networks or groups 
(including diasporas) might facilitate mobility. In 
addition, while ‘the border’ is a dominant theme, 
containment practices to prevent migrants, asylum-
seekers and refugees from reaching the territory of a 
state have also been studied. The logic of ‘blaming 
migrants’, inherent in many of these practices, is 
problematic because it ‘misrecognises structural issues 
such as refugee flows, urban riots, crime, unemployment 
and welfare dependency as the attributes of migrants 
that need to be policed and regulated’ (Humphrey 
2013: 179). 
How such structural elements fit within securitising 
processes – and the role that the forced migration and 
displacement cycle plays – requires further attention. 
In line with these observations, the next section will 
look more closely at the literature that considers 
containment strategies or the so-called ‘externalisation’ 
of asylum/migration controls. However, before moving 
to that discussion, we will complete our analysis of 
securitisation discourses and practices by exploring 
the role that terrorism and radicalisation play in their 
generation and sustaining.
2.4 TERRORISM AND 
THE SECURITISATION OF 
MIGRATION AND ASYLUM
The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New 
York on 11 September 2001 is frequently associated 
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with the securitisation of migration and asylum in 
Western democracies and the links to terrorism and 
radicalisation (Humphrey 2013; den Boer and Monar 
2002), with problematic consequences in terms of how 
policy planning and implementation takes place. In the 
words of Koser and Cunningham (2017: 209),
Without [...] denying the potential of migrants 
(or refugees) to turn to extreme violence, the 
risk is that isolated contemporary incidents, 
or distant historical examples, are taken 
out of context and then projected into the 
future and used as the basis for sweeping 
generalisations about the threat that large-
scale migration and asylum flows may pose 
to national and regional security.
Avdan’s (2014) quantitative analysis of origin-specific 
asylum recognition rates in 17 Western European 
countries from 1980 to 2008 comes to the conclusion that 
transnational terrorism has not eroded humanitarianism 
in asylum admissions. The rate of acceptance of 
asylum applications is influenced by direct experience 
with terrorist attacks, not by the general occurrence of 
terrorist attacks worldwide (2014: 465). Avdan also 
finds that ‘Muslim states encounter significantly lower 
rates of recognition’ (2014: 459), and that ‘policy 
tightening in Europe does not discriminate against 
origin countries that export terrorism even when such 
attacks involve victims of recipient states’ (2014: 465). 
We will return to these two specific findings later in 
the section but for now what this research shows is that 
the relationship between terrorism and asylum is more 
complex that what popular discourses on 9/11 and 
subsequent attacks would imply.5
Huysmans and Buonfino (2008)’s empirical analysis of 
discursive action in the British Parliament (both Houses) 
between 11 September 2001 and early June 2004 also 
provides a note of caution against over-emphasising 
the role that 9/11 has since played on securitising 
debates on migration. While parliamentary debates 
gave support to the view that immigration and asylum 
might be vehicles for terrorist and security breaches, 
this ‘fluctuated quite significantly within the political 
field’ (2008: 767). Such fluctuation can be explained 
by the general reluctance in the British Parliament to 
explicitly maintain a connection between terrorism and 
5  It is also interesting to notice how the title of  Avdan’s paper mentions both ‘asylum recognition rates’ and ‘the migration-security nexus 
revised’, suggesting again the conflation of  different terminology.
migration, principally to avoid excessive politicisation 
of the issues or exacerbating the risk of demonisation 
of migrants and the undermining of social cohesion. 
Importantly, ‘this does not mean that migration and 
asylum are not securitised; but the way they are embedded 
within security framings, at least among the political 
elite, is more multifaceted than simply suggesting 
that terrorism plays a major role in structuring these 
framings’ (Huysmans and Buonfino 2008: 767). For 
these authors focusing exclusively on the connections 
between migration, asylum and (counter-)terrorism risks 
downplaying other important securitising dynamics 
resulting from the ‘politics of unease’ that addresses 
policy areas that contribute to a ‘general context of 
societal insecurities and unease’ (2008: 781), such as 
welfare provision, identity and irregular migration, and 
specifically justifies the introduction of identification 
technology for surveillance and control. Huysmans 
and Buonfino therefore argue a two-level analysis of 
securitisation which not only reflects the realist/critical 
security studies divide but also presents the depth of 
the migration/asylum-security nexus beyond the fear 
of terrorist attacks. As Seidman-Zager (2010: 4) states, 
‘the implication of links between asylum-seekers and 
terrorism is […] only one facet of a broader discourse 
on immigration- and asylum-related securitisation’.
In the European context there is no unanimous 
agreement on the impact that 9/11 had on the 
migration/asylum-security nexus. Some reject the 
causality arguing, as Baker-Beall does (2009: 194 - 
emphasis in original), that even ‘before the events of 
11 September 2001, the construction of the immigrant 
“other” as a potential threat to European society and 
therefore European identity, was a central theme 
within the EU’s internal security policy’ (see also 
Boswell 2007; Gibney 2002; Karyotis 2007). Others 
have suggested that although not new to Europe, the 
relation between asylum and migration policy and 
security concerns strengthened, accelerated and/or 
became more prominent after 9/11 (Den Boer and 
Monar 2002; Crisp 2003; Buonfino 2004).
For Schlentz (2010) this variety of opinion reflects the 
need for more systematic and rigorous analysis of the 
European case, which she sought to address through 
a comprehensive study of policies, laws, technological 
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solutions, and administrative and operational practices 
in the European Union (EU). Her conclusion is that 
9/11 ‘did matter because it escalated the securitisation 
of asylum and immigration in the EU [which] 
manifested both quantitative and qualitative change’ 
in the different areas explored (Schlentz 2010: 31). 
Baele and Sterck also seek to address the issue through 
a quantitative analysis, suggesting that while security 
language is strongly used at the EU level, there is 
‘uneven intensity of this framing’ depending on which 
‘subfields of immigration are being analysed’ (2015: 
1133). Their results also suggest that while ‘asylum’ is 
less heavily securitised than ‘illegal migration’, ‘very 
different situations are conglomerated within this label 
of “illegal’’’ (Baele and Sterck 2015: 1132), which 
allegedly refers to the conflation of the migration- and 
asylum security nexa.
A parallel debate that has developed in relation to the 
events of 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks is what 
contribution they have made to the securitisation of 
‘the figure of the Muslim’ (Diez and Squire 2008: 577) 
compared to other ethnic or religious groups. Kaya 
(2012: 405) reflects on contemporary events, including 
terrorist attacks, but also popular debates about Muslim 
traditions (e.g., the use of the hijab or the burqa), to 
argue that ‘prejudiced perceptions about Islam’ have 
contributed to the image of Muslims as the ‘enemy 
within’ threatening Western civilisation, leading to the 
rise of ‘Islamophobia’ as a political ideology and form 
of governance. 
Fekete (2004: 3-4) describes the promotion of 
‘monocultural homogeneity through assimilation’ in 
Europe and that applies both to Muslim citizens and 
immigrants ‘as an adjunct to anti-terrorist law’ but also 
a means to combat the broader fear that ‘adherence 
to Islamic norms and values threatens the notion of 
Europeanness’. For this author these developments 
cannot be explained by ‘Islamophobia’ alone, they 
are ‘structured anti-Muslim racism’ (Fekete 2004: 3). 
Humphrey (2013)’s study of Muslim immigration in to 
Australia shows that 9/11 effectively transformed the 
consideration of Muslims from an ‘ethnic/religious 
minority in a multicultural society’ to a ‘transnational 
risk’ (2013: 182). However, he also recognises that prior 
to 9/11 Muslims in Australia were already ‘stigmatised 
as a culturally problematic and socially marginalised 
immigrant community’ (2013: 182). 
These studies show that 9/11 and subsequent terrorist 
attacks may have provided a legitimising platform for the 
securitisation of Muslim populations, both citizens and 
immigrants, but also draw our attention to the literature 
that considers the role that race and racism play in the 
construction of these securitisation discourses and 
practices (see, for example, Ibrahim 2005; Moffette 
and Vadasaria 2016; Schuster 2003). However, the 
tendency of the literature to group ‘Muslims’ under 
one entity makes it very difficult to analyse in more 
depth the impact that securitisation has had on different 
groups within this larger category, including those 
who have been settled over many generations, recent 
arrivals, or refugees and asylum-seekers.
2.5 THE ASYLUM-SECURITY 
NEXUS, THE ‘DISPLACEMENT 
CYCLE’ AND HUMAN 
INSECURITY
The narrative of ‘the border’, as previously discussed, 
is a dominant theme in the literature on migration, 
asylum and security. The ‘externalisation’ of migration/
asylum controls and the securitisation of host country 
entry and settlement policies for migrants, including 
refugees, complements the preference for ‘tightening’ 
borders. While these themes invite reflection on the 
forced migration and displacement cycle (displacement/
flight, encampment, onward movement, settlement/
integration), the focus is restricted to the impact 
securitisation has had on certain stages of this cycle. The 
possibility that structural vulnerabilities in the cycle 
could contribute to finding alternative explanations 
to the migration/asylum-security nexus, or to moving 
the onus of attention away from the refugee and the 
asylum-seeker as the threat, is thus far largely absent 
from the debate.
The ‘externalisation’ of migration/asylum control 
refers to those measures aimed at preventing the arrival 
in a state’s territory of what Humphrey’s (2013: 185) 
has described as ‘illegal immigrants, asylum seekers 
and unwanted cultural and political influences from 
diasporas’. This ‘containment of the risk’ relies 
on outsourcing mechanisms and agreements with 
other states, security professionals, corporations, 
international organisations and NGOs. Measures 
normally associated with containment practices – that 
Humphrey (2013: 180) terms ‘hypergovernance’ or 
transnational management of populations – include at 
the very far end conflict management, state building, 
and other human security and development-oriented 
policies in countries generating ‘unwanted migrants’. 
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Other measures incorporate interception and detention 
en route and the extra-territorial processing of asylum 
claims. Examples of the latter comprise the ‘welcome 
and departure centres’ in major transit countries 
in North Africa proposed in November 2014 by 
German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, or 
the designation of Turkey as ‘safe’ transit country in 
the EU ‘migration crisis’ that began in 2015 (Leonard 
and Kaunert 2016; Slominski and Trauner 2017 – see 
also Schuster 2003: 234). Additional examples would 
include the temporary holding centres in Guantanamo 
Bay and the ‘offshore processing centres’ in Jamaica 
and the Turks and Caicos Islands that the US instigated 
in the 1990s to prevent asylum-seekers from Haiti 
reaching its shores, or the equivalent arrangements that 
Australia developed in the 2000s with Nauru and Manus 
Island in Papua New Guinea to manage asylum-seekers 
intercepted in unauthorised vessels at sea (Leonard and 
Kaunert 2016: 49).
As Leonard and Kaunert explain (2016: 50), the 
extra-territorial processing of asylum claims has been 
portrayed by some as a positive measure to reduce the 
life-threatening risks that asylum seekers take in their 
journeys to reach their preferred destination, to provide 
them protection closer to their country or region of 
origin, while at the same weakening the profit-making 
organised crime groups that run the smuggling routes. 
Moreno-Lax finds this set of explanations paradoxical 
when applied to search and rescue operations in the 
Mediterranean given that they amount to the ‘invocation 
of human rights [...] to curtail (migrants’) human rights, 
justifying interdiction (‘to save lives’), and impending 
access to safety in Europe’ (2018: 119 – see also 
Hyndman and Mountz 2008). Moreover, rather than 
6  Seidman-Zager also challenges the idea that securitisation necessarily brings benefits but develops this argument in relation to a different 
aspect of  the debate. He focuses on the impact of  increased security measures on the human security of  the hosting community, drawing 
attention, among other things, to the ‘psychological distress [that] may stem from living with a heightened state of  alertness and harbouring a fear 
of  the unknown due to the presence of  an unpredictable threat that could strike indiscriminately’ (Hassett and Sigal 2002: 1809, cited in Seidman-
Zager 2010: 19).
7  Kaunert and Leonard (2011) have argued against the claim that at least some Member States have been willing to cooperate at the 
EU-level on asylum and migration matters as a means to avoid liberal domestic pressures on the introduction of  more restrictive measures in 
their own countries. They find that cooperation at the EU-level has led to more protection standards for refugees and asylum-seekers due to 
institutional changes that have provided more of  a role to ‘refugee-friendly’ EU institutions and the increasing ‘judicialisation’ of  asylum matters. 
Although they were writing before the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, and even if  there is still room for improvement in the EU approach, their analysis 
remains pertinent to understand the divisions and tensions that developed between EU institutions and certain Member States over the best 
response to the mass influx of  refugees from the Mediterranean.
8  The Copenhagen School’s agenda is to have less, rather than more, security by showing how an issue can be moved in to the security 
realm and the consequences of  doing so (see, for example, Waever 1995). Calls to move migration away from the security domain therefore fall 
well in line with this agenda.
‘solving’ the problem, these measures may accentuate 
it, as Morrison and Crosland’s (2001) findings would 
suggest. These authors conclude that by the late 1990s 
the effect that EU’s increasingly restrictive legal entry 
options could be having was to indirectly encourage 
a higher number of asylum-seekers to resort to the 
services of traffickers and smugglers.6
Extra-territorial practices – and many other under the 
‘externalisation’ umbrella – have generated criticism 
for their tendency to confine migrants and asylum-
seekers in ‘excluded’ spaces, making their experience 
‘invisible’ and raising legal and moral concerns over the 
protection of their human rights, as clearly illustrated 
by the many questions raised over of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement particularly in relation to the handling of 
asylum-seekers by the Turkish authorities (Mountz 
2015: 190; Niemann and Zaun 2018: 8-9 – see also 
Leonard and Kaunert 2016; Geddes 2015; Humphrey 
2013; Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017; Gibney 
2004; Watson 2009; Feller 2006).7 There is increasingly 
published analysis of loss of rights experienced by 
refugees and asylum-seekers (Crépeau, Nakache 
and Atak 2007; Pocora 2016; Truong and Gasper 
2011; Seidman-Zager 2010). Feller (2005, 2006), for 
example, observes that ‘refugees are not migrants’ and 
therefore need specific policies of protection which 
are being hindered by securitising policies, even at the 
expense of other mobility policies. Researchers have 
called for the desecuritisation of forced migration by 
returning it to the realm of humanitarian and human 
rights politics (Harada and Kimura 2011; Feller 2005; 
Crépeau, Nakache and Atak 2007).8
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For Hammerstand (2014), among others, the 
securitisation of ‘vulnerable people’ (including 
refugees) has brought something positive; it has allowed 
researchers and practitioners alike to increase awareness 
of the different stages of the displacement cycle – 
which are often neglected – in order to develop better 
tailored policies and institutions (see also Doty 1998; 
Innes 2014; Gerard and Pickering 2014). However, 
while some academic literature uses the migration/
asylum-security nexus to reiterate the need to develop a 
system based on the logic of ‘human rights’ (Crépeau, 
Nakache and Atak 2007; Pocora 2016), Hammerstadt 
argues that, ‘the aim of securitising forced migration as 
a human security or common security issues was […] 
less an academic endeavour than an activist one’ (2014: 
274).
Stokes-Dupass (2017) addresses the issue of the 
acceptance of asylum-seekers by host states and 
societies by focusing on Danish, Norwegian and 
Swedish responses to the Syrian refugee crisis, and the 
implications for citizenship trajectories and integration. 
The author argues that the ‘recent legislative changes and 
restrictive social policies created by [the Scandinavian] 
nation-states have greatly restricted movement of Syrian 
refugees into Scandinavia’ (Stokes-Dupass 2017: 58), 
affecting their ability to obtain naturalisation, and 
leaving them effectively ‘stateless’ with little or no 
guaranteed protection and limited opportunities for 
integration. 
Diez and Squire (2008) have studied developments in 
Germany and the United Kingdom, two EU countries 
with high immigration over the past decades, have 
developed and they argue that ‘traditions of citizenship’ 
such as the ius sanguinis (Germany) and ius soli (United 
Kingdom) – though undergoing a gradual process of 
convergence - have nevertheless different consequences 
in shaping the securitisation debate, with the former 
being more ‘racialised’ and consequently arguably 
more directly linked to the articulation of migrants as 
potential terrorist and ‘foreign others’ (Diez and Squire 
2008: 577-578). This, however, could have important 
implications, for example, in the analysis of second-
generation refugees, and the extent to which more 
liberal integration policies affect the radicalisation of 
these groups.
9  The Ethnic and Racial Studies' Special Issue on Migration and Citizenship published in 2005 (Lewis and Neal 2005; Sales 2005; Flynn 2005) 
provides a good framework to contextualise the tensions surrounding asylum, labour needs and multicultural citizenship that Stewart and Muley’s 
(2014) research addresses.
The findings of Stewart and Muley (2014) agree with 
Diez and Squire that the UK has experienced less of a 
securitisation of migration directly related to terrorism, 
and instead has been more affected by the ‘politics of 
unease’ described by Huysmans and Buonfino (2008 – 
see previous section). On the basis of interviews with 
refugees granted status before and after 2005, Stewart 
and Muley challenge ‘the notion that providing physical 
refuge and temporary refugee status will necessarily 
lead to long-term integration’ and instead argue that 
such temporary status (five years in length) generates 
‘fear and uncertainty [among refugees] over their 
futures’ (2014: 1033) and may have prevented them 
from entering the workforce, leading many to seek 
naturalisation for the ‘wrong reasons’ (2014: 1036). 
The overall argument of the authors is that asylum 
legislation in the UK has resulted in an erosion of the 
rights of asylum-seekers and refugees, who are left 
increasingly marginalised and insecure.9
The conclusions reached by Stewart and Muley on the 
importance of the economic inclusion of refugees for 
their long-term integration is reinforced by Barslund 
et al’s (2016) analysis of Bosnian refugees in several 
European countries. They argue that granting the 
right to work is a key factor to favour the insertion of 
refugees in societies, although ‘failing to do so can still 
lead to good long-term labour market outcomes’ (2016: 
1). While providing access to the economic market 
is clearly important, the authors partially admit that 
taking a macro-economic approach misses out both on 
micro-level data and non-economic factors that might 
have favoured integration processes, including the 
(absence of) security-related issues that could impact 
on how refugees, especially from certain nationalities 
or religious/ethnic groups, relate to their hosting 
societies. This could affect how migrants and refugees 
consider their membership within a community, which 
in turn might influence their security profile.
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3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND 
SECURITY: LESSONS FROM THE 
RADICALISATION LITERATURE
Over the last decade radicalisation has become an 
overriding concern in policy, practice and academic 
research (Dzhekova  2016; Rahimi and Graumans 
2015; Silke 2008). Between 2005 and 2006 the use of 
the term in English-language press more than doubled 
(Sedgwick 2010), and a greater number of books on 
radicalisation and terrorism were published in the five 
years following 9/11 that in the previous fifty years 
combined (Silke 2008).
There is consensus across the literature that 
‘radicalisation’ refers to a ‘readiness to pursue and 
support far-reaching changes in society’ (Dalgaard-
Nielsen 2010: 798) but beyond the broad definition 
there is no agreement on the causes and methods of 
radicalisation or ideal approaches to intervention, and 
generalising ‘theories of radicalisation’ have therefore 
not been developed (Dawson 2017). Instead, many 
scholars have focused on understanding motivations 
and drivers of radicalised behaviours with a strong 
focus on Muslims, Islam and Jihadi terrorism (Abdi 
2015; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Klausen et al 2016), 
including attempts at defining a ‘taxonomy’ of the Jihadi 
terrorist (Bryson 2017; Bakker 2011; Hegghammer 
2011; Sageman 2004 among others). A much smaller 
literature examines radicalisation among non-Islamic 
diasporas including Sri Lankan Tamils (Thompson and 
Bucerius 2017) and Albanians (Koinova, 2011).
In attempting to understand the processes of 
radicalisation much of the literature focuses on 
sociological factors including: immigration and 
integration (Rahimi and Graumans 2015); the youth 
(Abdi 2015; Bakker and Grol 2015; Dawson and 
Amarasignam 2017; Thompson and Bucerius 2017); 
the space of the camp or the border (Cruickshank 
2010; Rabil 2016); homegrown terrorism, including 
in Europe (Crisp 2017; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; 
Hegghammer 2013; Klausen  2016); the role of the 
internet in facilitating radicalisation (Dawson and 
Amarasignam 2017; Pearson 2016; Von Behr  2013); 
gendered terrorism (Pearson 2016) and refugees (Abdi 
2015; Sude, Stebbins, and Weilant 2015). While these 
topics should move the literature beyond Jihadism, 
Dzhekova  find that ‘the application of analytical models 
developed within radicalisation research remains 
underdeveloped beyond studies of Islamic terrorism’ 
(2016: 8), leading Roy (2017) to observe that we are 
seeing the ‘Islamisation of radicalisation’ rather than 
the ‘radicalisation of Islam’.
For a number of authors violence is critical to 
understanding the radicalisation process. Schmid, 
for example, considers radicalisation as ‘the process 
through which individuals become socialised into 
political violence’ (Schmid 2011: 217, cited in 
Dzhekova  2016: 9), thus asserting a causality between 
radical or extremist views and attitudes on the one 
hand, and political violence on the other. For Dzhekova 
(2016: 7) such an assumption is misleading because it is 
possible for groups or individuals to seek ‘far-reaching 
changes in society’ that ‘may not constitute a danger 
to democracy and may or may not involve the threat 
of or use of violence’ (Veldhuis and Staun 2009, cited 
in Borum 2011: 12). The holding of radical views and 
the pursuit of radical aims may therefore be a peaceful 
endeavour, however, research tends to overlook such 
engagement particularly when the agents of change are 
relatively ‘invisible’ (e.g., asylum-seekers, rejected and 
returned asylum-seekers, or even refugees). 
Similarly, Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010: 
10 - emphasis added) suggest that ‘non-violent 
radicalisation’ refers to ‘the process by which 
individuals come to hold radical views in relation to 
the status quo but do not undertake, or directly aid or 
abet terrorist activity’. This definition is useful because 
it highlights the possibility of peaceful-like situations 
of change, but also, simultaneously expands the remit 
of what is considered as violent forms of radicalisation 
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by including long-distance financial support to radical 
or terrorist groups, even if those individuals are not 
present during the perpetration of violent actions (as, 
for example, in conflict or war zones).
The following two sections analyse the rapidly growing 
literature on radicalisation by focusing on two main 
themes that are more relevant to refugee politics and 
political extremism: drivers of radicalisation, and 
identified characteristics of terrorists.
3.1 DRIVERS OF 
RADICALISATION
Several academic and policy-related studies have 
sought to develop ‘models’ to explain the radicalisation 
processes, including: the four-stage model of the terrorist 
mindset reported in an FBI Bulletin (Borum 2003); 
the ‘Staircase to Terrorism’ (Moghaddam 2005); or 
the NYPD’s four stage model of Islamic radicalisation 
(Silber and Bhatt 2007), which inspired subsequent 
research (Klausen et al 2016). These models are 
designed to have a predictive capacity providing early 
warnings of future radicalisation, a diagnostic function 
to explain the process of radicalisation, a research 
function to guide others working in the field, and to a 
lesser extent, a problem resolution function pointing to 
potential intervention to avoid radicalisation. 
The models identify ‘triggers’ or precipitating factors 
for individuals becoming radicalised including social 
alienation, discrimination or social exclusion, racism, 
and poverty. Yusoufzai and Emmerling (2017), for 
example, argue that Western Muslims radicalise because 
of four factors: identity crisis; relative deprivation; 
personal characteristics such as narcissism; and lack 
of empathy. The Guardian (2017) reports, ‘ongoing 
research into causes of Islamic militancy has underlined 
the complexity of motives of recruits and volunteers, 
as well as differences between different conflict zones’, 
with ‘religious beliefs, poverty, a lack of education 
and work’ and the opportunities offered through 
radicalisation being among the main drivers in Nigeria 
to join Boko Haram. However, research by Mercy 
Corps (2016) notes that Boko Haram recruited young 
entrepreneurs in Nigeria with promises of protection 
and investment to boost their businesses a situation that 
resonates with the idea that ‘individual experiences are 
actually more significant than legal status in explaining 
why some people may become radicalised’ (Koser 
and Cunningham 2017: 210). The research also points 
to the need to treat the relationship between poverty 
and/or educational levels and radicalisation with great 
care. World Bank research, for example, has shown 
that Islamic State/Daesh recruits from Africa, south 
and east Asia and the Middle East were ‘significantly 
more educated than individuals from their cohort in 
their region of origin’ (cited in The Guardian 2017). 
Research conducted in 2016 by the French think-tank 
Centre de Prévention contre le Dérives Sectaires Liées 
à l’Islam (Bouzar and Rollie Flynn 2017) on, among 
other things, patterns of radicalisation among French 
teenagers found that among the 809 individuals that 
had been stopped when trying to leave France to join 
the Islamic State/Daesh there was substantial diversity 
in terms of socio-economic class, religious background, 
recent immigrant history and gender. What these 
examples illustrate is the need to further research non-
marginalisation-related radicalisation, or a rethink of 
the meaning of marginalisation.
Dzhekova et al (2016: 7)’s conceptualise radicalisation 
as ‘a dynamic, multi-staged and multifaceted 
phenomenon’, demanding that research needs to 
address a wide range of contingent factors that might 
influence its development, and here the research of 
Rahimi and Graumans (2015), Dawson (2017), Lemon 
and Heathershaw (2017) and Klausen et al (2016) is 
particularly useful. However, Rahimi and Graumans 
(2015: 28) also caution that ‘regardless of the diversity 
of causes, academic literature as well as governmental 
strategies have shown a consistent interest in the basic 
formula that a lack of cultural integration equals an 
increased threat of radicalisation’. While integration 
shows the relevance of radicalisation to migration and 
asylum, it is important not to assume that integration is 
limited to ‘foreigners’. On the contrary, several studies 
have emphasised the risks of so called homegrown 
terrorism, both of foreign and non-foreign origins 
(Klausen et al 2016; Lia and Nesser 2016; Silber and 
Bhatt 2007; Yusoufzai and Emmerling 2017). Dawson 
(2017: 6) suggests that because data of Jihadis in 
non-Muslim majority countries are predominantly of 
1.5 to 2.0 generation of immigrants, ‘there is a link 
between homegrown terrorism and the unprecedented 
movement of peoples around the world [and] the ability 
of immigrants to stay in regular contact with people 
and issues in their homeland’.
The inclination to equate lack of cultural integration 
with an increased threat of radicalisation has led, 
Rahimi and Graumans (2015) argue, to ineffective 
or damaging interventions that may actually increase 
rather than reduce the incidence of radicalisation. 
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Gould and Klor, for example, find that the backlash 
against Muslims groups in the US following 9/11 – 
measured by reported incidents of hate crime - slowed 
down their assimilation, as revealed in statistics 
suggesting higher rates of intra-marriages and fertility, 
lower rates of female labour force participation and 
English proficiency. The authors conclude that ‘terror 
attacks against Western targets may have a long-term 
political and socio-economic impact, by creating a 
more ethnically cohesive Muslim community in this 
generation and also the next’ (Gould and Klor 2016: 
2066). In the UK a number of academics have similarly 
argued that the government’s PREVENT Strategy and 
its implementation has maintained a sole focus on 
British Muslims, undermining community cohesion 
and building resentment towards the government with 
accusations both of surveillance and of engineering 
‘value changes’ within Muslim communities (Awan 
2012; Thomas 2010).
Gould and Klor further suggest that ‘terror groups may 
also intentionally induce a backlash on persons of a 
similar ethnic origin in the targeted country, in order to 
decrease their rate of assimilation’ (2016: 2066). The 
authors claim this is an important contribution to the 
literature which has so far concentrated on the backlash 
against the country or territory where terror groups 
reside following an act of violence. For the authors of 
this CREST project what is interesting about Gould 
and Klor’s finding is that it signals the importance of 
diaspora groups in processes of radicalisation.
Groups and networks are considered vital in processes 
towards or away from radicalisation, both in everyday 
interactions as on the internet (Abdi 2015; Dawson 
2017; Silke 2008; Von Behr et al 2013). Bakker (2006), 
for example, found in an analysis of 242 Jihadis that 
individuals tended to become radicalised through 
networks of friends or relatives, and Van Engeland 
(2016) studies the active mediating role that Muslim 
communities can play in diffusing tensions and violence. 
Thompson and Bucerius (2017) present key insights 
on the role of diasporas in perpetrating or halting 
radicalisation. On the basis of 168 in-depth interviews 
with youth and young adults in Toronto belonging to 
the Tamil and Somali diasporas, the research suggests 
that the two groups provide very different case studies 
to ‘examine the varying ways that existing sentiment 
pools can operate to mobilise broad levels of support 
for, or vilification of, the framing strategies of terrorist 
entities and their supporters’ (Thompson and Bucerius 
2017: 12 - emphasis added). Rather than adopting a 
one-size-fits-all approach, Thompson and Bucerius 
argue that ‘framing’ and ‘group sentiments’ play a 
key role in influencing whether young people may be 
vulnerable to radicalisation. For example, the positive 
portrayal of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) by the diaspora as ‘the organisation that takes 
the plight of the Tamil people’ (2017: 8) strongly 
influenced the perceptions of the group and the 
political cause of separatism held by Tamil-Canadians. 
The fact that Canada labelled the LTTE as a terrorist 
organisation negatively affected the perception that 
these interviewees had of their (host) country. 
In opposition, the negative portrayal of Al Shabaab 
by the Somali diaspora was found to be a significant 
factor in steering young Somali Canadians away from 
extremist narratives and reduced their vulnerability 
to recruitment. This research shows that while 
‘hypermarginalisation’ certainly plays an important 
role in rendering certain communities more vulnerable 
to radicalisation, those same communities can also 
play an active and key role in triggering action, both in 
positive and negative terms. The relationship between 
diasporas and processes of radicalisation is a theme that 
could provide new insights into the ‘peace-wrecking/
peace-building’ debate on diasporas but that by and 
large has so far not been looked at by the Diaspora 
Studies literature.
Abdi (2015)’s research into Somali groups in the United 
States finds that race, (lack of) income and religion have 
played key roles both in processes of ‘othering’ and in 
contributing to the radicalisation of Somali refugees, 
particularly the youth. Abdi’s findings were similar to 
those of Thompson and Bucerius (2017) noting that 
there has been a concerted effort by the Somali diaspora 
to fight back ‘hyperbolisations’ on the (potential) scale 
of Somali youth radicalised in Minnesota. However, at 
the same time, he states that many young men in the 
Somali community face the ‘potential double burden 
of the lure of gangs and extremist groups as well as 
contact with institution and policies that discriminate 
on the bases of race, religion and class’, dangers that 
are further accentuated by ‘zealous sensationalist local, 
national and global media’ (2015: 575). 
Interestingly, Abdi observes that government support 
through refugee schemes does not necessarily help 
refugees in better integrating into society, and 
rather they entail further stigma and stereotyping as 
‘newcomers become immersed in America’s structural 
racism’ (2015: 570). While this recalls the discussion 
in Thematic Report Two on policies of integration, it 
remains unclear whether the condition of refugees 
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holding a special socio-political ‘baggage’ affects 
radicalisation in any specific way.
In relation to the role of religion in processes of 
radicalisation, three ‘clusters’ can be identified in the 
literature. While the impact of religion and ideology as 
factors contributing to radicalisation is broadly accepted, 
the literature is increasingly dominated by sociological 
analysis focusing on material conditions and issues 
related to personal identity, social context and social 
networks as key predispositions to radicalisation (Silke 
2008; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Borum 2003). 
Silke (2008: 111), for example, argues that ‘in order 
to understand the mind-set of Islamist terrorism, one 
needs to move beyond the limits of religious doctrine’, 
centring instead on factors such as group loyalties, 
marginalisation and discrimination. Others (Coolsaet 
2016; Sageman 2004) contend that while ideology 
may be relevant, religion per se is not. Finally, a third 
branch suggests that religion and ideology are both key 
factors in driving radicalisation (Kepel 2017), with 
Orsini (2012) providing an interesting account on the 
impact that ideology has on people who are seemingly 
not marginalised in society to join a left-wing terrorist 
organisation.
The Internet, and especially social media, is seen as 
a crucial facilitator in creating networks and enabling 
engagement in recruitment processes, however, 
research is limited on the ‘demand-side’ that would 
explain why and how individuals reach out to such 
networks through digital communication (Von Behr 
et al 2013). While certainly the use of the internet for 
radicalisation purposes has increased, most notably 
through the propaganda efforts of the Islamic State/
Daesh, Stevens and Neumann warn against policies 
that overstate its importance; ‘radicalisation is largely 
a real-world phenomenon that cannot be dealt with 
simply by “pulling the plug’’’ (2009: 1).
A RAND Corporation report on refugee radicalisation 
considers how radicalisation happens rather than 
why individuals become militants of groups such as 
Islamic State/Daesh (Sude, Stebbins and Weilant 2015 
– emphasis in the original). The research considers 
the geographic location of refugees, the pre-existence 
of militant groups in refugee areas and the policies 
and actions of host countries and the international 
community (Sude, Stebbins and Weilant 2015: 1, 
3). In this way the research begins to seek structural 
explanations for refugee engagement in extremist 
politics that originate in the forced migration and 
displacement cycle and in the conditions of asylum 
seeking in Western states. Dawson (2017) calls for a 
similar approach to shift the onus of analysis from the 
‘why’ to the ‘how’, suggesting the need to consider 
‘situations’, ‘contexts’ and ‘life experiences’.
To this end, research has focused on the ‘camp’ as a 
space of exception (Agamben 1998) and one where 
refugees become political actors, recalling Rygiel’s 
(2011) discussion of the camp as a political space, 
whereby subjectivities and boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion are negotiated and exercised, and where 
radicalisation processes might emerge in response to 
those processes. Milton, Spencer and Findley (2013: 
637) find that that the conditions of the camp and the 
ways in which host states treat refugees ‘can lead to 
transnational terrorism as some smaller subset of the 
refugee population responds against the host state’. 
Martin-Rayo (2011) highlights conditions within camps 
that might facilitate radicalisation processes, such as 
poor education, lack of freedom of movement and 
work; factors that have also been considered by several 
policy papers that refer to refugee camps as fertile 
grounds for recruitment and radicalisation (Koser 
and Cunningham 2017; Sude, Stebbins and Weilant 
2015). Sude, Stebbins and Weilant (2015) imply 
that lessening the risk of radicalisation goes beyond 
providing immediate humanitarian assistance, and 
rather requires a multi-level and long-term approach 
that provides refugees with viable choices for the 
future. As Koser and Cunningham (2017) write in the 
International Organization for Migration’s 2017 World 
Migration Report, providing psychological and security 
needs is particularly important because refugees might 
experience abuse or powerlessness in their place of 
refuge, and militant groups might exploit the situation 
to radicalise vulnerable groups (especially youth) ‘with 
narratives of empowerment through violence’ (2017: 
215). These ideas strongly resonate with Rygel’s (2011) 
understanding of subjectivities, and the extent to which 
a negative perception of one’s own subjectivity within 
a camp (due to abuse, humiliation or powerlessness) 
could give way to radicalising processes.
The literature suggests that radicalisation is a multi-
faceted phenomenon, and that further research is 
needed to address the wide range of factors that might 
influence its development. While the focus on the ‘lack 
of integration’ sheds some light on refugee-specific 
situations, and despite Dawson's (2017) argument 
that radicalisation is directly related to movement 
(and hence, displacement), existing literature does not 
adequately identify any relevant difference between 
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‘immigrants’ at large and refugee-specific contexts. 
This is particularly interesting considering that most 
post-2001 literature on radicalisation and terrorism 
focuses on Muslims and ‘immigrant backgrounds’ 
as key elements of the discussion. The next section 
will observe whether this is also reflected in the 
‘characteristics’ of terrorists.
3.2 THE ‘TAXONOMY’ OF 
TERRORISTS
Literature on the drivers of radicalisation and 
characteristics of terrorists overlap, as both often 
consider personal characteristics such as loneliness, 
marginalisation caused by immigrant or cultural 
background, or poverty as important factors. 
Several authors (Bryson 2017; Bakker 2006, 2011; 
Hegghammer 2011; Sageman 2004) have attempted 
to create a ‘taxonomy’ of Islamic terrorists, often 
by analysing case studies of past terrorist attacks 
in search of common traits among the perpetrators. 
While it is often agreed that the most recent attacks 
have been carried out by young males from immigrant 
backgrounds10, other factors such as socio-economic 
circumstances, religion or levels of marginalisation 
vary considerably, reflecting the discussions earlier in 
the report.
Koser and Cunningham observe that a sizeable 
proportion of foreign terrorist fighters from Europe 
(FTFs - those who travel abroad to engage in direct 
conflict) are often European citizens and descendants 
of migrants, which might flag that ‘a migrant 
background may be symptomatic of a long-term failure 
of integration, resulting in social exclusion’ (2017: 
210). Crone  (2017) also highlight the European 
background – either as citizens or residents – of those 
engaged in terrorist action in European soil within the 
last decade. However, Klausen  (2016: 79) suggest 
that ‘many Muslim terrorists are converts to Islam 
rather than demographically “Muslims”’, while Lia 
and Nesser’s (2016: 121) analysis of the evolution of 
terrorist networks in Norway describes the current 
scenario as consisting of ‘Norwegian speaking youth 
of multiple ethnic origins, including a number of 
Norwegian converts’.
10  Authors like Pearson (2016) bring to our attention the fact that women’s radicalisation and involvement in terrorist activities is 
understudied because of  the lack of  gendered approaches within the literature.
Bryson (2017: 35) when seeking to identify relevant 
biographical characteristics among terrorists in the 
UK does not consider asylum or refugee status. 
Bakker (2011) identifies the significance of being 
a marginalised immigrant but he does not consider 
refugeehood as a potential defining characteristic of 
radicalised individuals. On the other hand, as discussed 
previously, authors such as Milton, Spencer and 
Findley (2013) have considered potential links between 
the conditions of displacement and radicalisation, for 
example, in relation to periods spent in camps and the 
treatment received by host states, including during the 
asylum process, and the contribution that refugee flows 
can make to transnational terrorism. Ellis  (2015: 858) 
suggests that ‘greater exposure to personal trauma’ 
among Somali refugees ‘was associated with greater 
openness to illegal and violent activism’. While the 
Somali community in the United States was generally 
open to legal non-violent activism, which recalls the 
initial discussion on radicalisation as not necessarily 
being violent, the study by Ellis  supports the 
understanding that refugees’ experiences during their 
displacement cycle indeed affects the extent to which 
radicalisation processes develop. In general, however, 
the relevance of a refugee or asylum background to the 
risk of radicalisation and the potential to carry out acts 
of terrorism in countries of asylum or naturalisation, 
are not widely discussed in the literature.
3.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH
It is a finding of this review and the CREST research 
project for which the three thematic reports have been 
prepared - and given the reported high incidence of 
asylum seekers, failed asylum seekers, first and second 
generation refugees’ involvement in acts of terrorism 
in Europe since 2015 (see Annex A) - that further 
research is required in to the causal relationship, if any, 
between an individual’s asylum and refugee profile and 
experience, and the appeal of violent and extremist 
narratives, as well as the risk of radicalisation by 
terrorist groups.
As discussed above, authors including Sude, Stebbins 
and Weilant (2015), Dawson (2017), Rabil (2016) and 
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Rygiel’s (2011), have drawn attention to the contextual 
risks associated with conflict-induced displacement 
and onward migration. Rabil (2016) conducted 
research among Syrian refugees in camps in Lebanon 
and noted that as a reaction against their humility and 
helplessness, a significant number of young Syrians, 
previously apolitical, were attracted to Salafism and 
transnational jihadism with an unknown number 
joining al-qaeda, Islamic State/Daesh and al-Nusrah. 
A recent UNHCR (2017a) report has shed further 
light on the conditions of life for Syrian refugees, and 
research conducted by McDowell, lead researcher for 
the CREST project for which this review was prepared, 
based on interviews with resettled Syrian refugees 
in the UK about their lives in Lebanon, exposed 
indebtedness, exploitative working conditions, a lack 
of education opportunities, and extremely poor housing 
conditions (UNHCR 2017b). Extremist groups, often 
operating in collaboration with people traffickers 
and smugglers, are able to exploit such severe 
vulnerabilities with, for example, offers of financial 
assistance to secure passage out of the region that tie 
refugees in to dependent relationships that continue 
once settlement in Europe has been achieved. Further 
research is necessary to better understand the nature of 
these relationships, operational aspects of cross-border 
movements and onward asylum journeys, and their 
human consequences.
 
As discussed previously, Dawson (2017: 6), among 
others, has suggested that given the profile of known 
terrorist in Western states ‘there is a link between 
homegrown terrorism and the unprecedented 
movement of peoples around the world [and] the ability 
of immigrants to stay in regular contact with people and 
issues in their homeland’. The literature, however, does 
not identify the processes of migration at an individual 
or family level that may shape an individual’s political 
development. This project recommends that additional 
research is undertaken based on the following 
observations:
• For a small minority of migrants who seek asylum, 
the life stage at which someone migrates is likely 
to be a factor in their future political development. 
Recent convictions for terrorist offences in Europe 
suggest that the extremist population includes people 
who migrated as children, with their families, and 
people who migrated as teenagers or young adults - 
often alone. This raises important questions about 
the asylum and migration experience for young 
people, their specific vulnerabilities and exposure 
to extremist narratives and controlling influences 
in the country of origin as well as in countries of 
asylum.
• The extremist population includes people whose 
relatives (either with them or ‘back home’) were 
involved in violent or nonviolent politics; some 
were or may have been extremists when they 
arrived. A research task, as Dawson (2017) notes, 
is to understand the form and content of ongoing 
politicisation in migration and settlement including 
through social media and how the experience of 
asylum-seeking and integration influence such 
politicisation.
• Whilst the evidence that can be derived through 
media and court reports is quite sparse, it does 
suggest that the extremist population includes 
individuals who apparently integrated well into 
mainstream society, people who settled well 
but in to insular groups (co-ethnic /co-religion, 
closed to outsiders), and also people who never 
seemed to settle anywhere (geographically, 
through employment, or via friendship circles). As 
discussed elsewhere in this report, in the absence 
of systematic longitudinal studies the evidence 
base on the integration trajectories of asylum 
seekers and resettled refugees in Western countries 
is weak. The conceptual and theoretical literature 
on refugee integration is limited to models that 
fail to address integration risks or consider the 
significance of political engagement as a factor in 
integration. Further research is required in to the 
process of asylum seeking and the struggles of 
settlement, with a focus on forms of integration 
through which emerge sub-cultures of mainly 
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young men who are likely to be disaffected with 
the state and their host society. A disaffection that 
stems in part from the experience of claiming 
asylum, a long drawn out legal process with 
uncertain outcomes, financial insecurity, working 
illegally, and living in poor conditions described by 
a number of NGOs as a condition of destitution, 
and according to some commentators more likely to 
suffer from discrimination and racism (see Oxfam 
2011). Sub-cultures are likely to be marked by the 
frequent isolation of individuals, or by the seeking 
of membership of closed groups of co-nationals or 
co-religionists.
A particularly under-researched topic of asylum 
integration relates to the experiences of asylum seekers 
whose applications have been turned down but who 
remain in their country of asylum evading the attention 
of the authorities, or are unreturnable (on the latter 
category see, for example, Refugee Law Initiative 
and Centre for International Criminal Justice 2016). 
A minority in this population could become part of 
criminal groups and gang membership that may later 
evolve into or engage in activities that intersect with 
extremist networks.
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CONCLUSION
This review was undertaken in the course of a CREST-
funded research project that provides – among 
other things - a comprehensive picture of the state 
of knowledge on political action among diasporas, 
refugee and asylum populations, with a particular 
interest in identifying factors that shape and influence 
processes of radicalisation and moderation among these 
communities. The current paper – Thematic Report 
Three – addresses the growing identification in popular 
and policy discourses of refugees and asylum-seekers 
with threats to international and national security, via 
the alleged link to terrorist and other criminal acts, and 
to societal security, via concerns over the economic 
burden and issues of identity, belonging and integration. 
The literature analysed in this review – from the fields 
of Security Studies and Radicalisation, and to a lesser 
extent, Diaspora Studies – provide the intellectual 
basis to argue that without more conceptual and 
theoretical research, and additional large-set but also 
micro-level data, multifaceted complex phenomena 
at stake in the migration/asylum-security nexus (such 
as radicalisation, refugeehood, displacement) cannot 
be reduced to the often-taken-for granted ‘lack of 
integration’ or ‘religion-driven’ arguments.
The theoretical approaches reviewed in this report 
are, however, not without limitations when applied to 
debates on asylum, security and extremism. First, the 
‘asylum-security nexus’ is more than often conflated 
with the ‘migration-security nexus’. While there 
have been some cases of specific refugee-related 
issues being analysed under the asylum-security 
nexus framework (Avdan 2014), the literature tends 
to overlook the specific experiences of refugees and 
asylum-seekers, and these are often ‘lost’ in analyses 
that generalise terminologies and empirical researches 
under the ‘migration’ term. There are other key terms 
that have equally not received sufficient attention, such 
as the tendency – less so in the radicalisation literature 
compared with Security Studies – to generalise various 
situations under umbrella terms such as ‘Muslims’ or 
‘foreigners’, limiting the depth of the analysis.
A second matter that needs to be considered is that both 
the Security Studies and Radicalisation literatures are, 
to different degrees, policy-oriented when applied to 
migration. The literature on radicalisation is heavily 
influenced by policy papers and analyses aimed at 
finding ‘solutions’ to the radicalisation problem. 
Traditional security approaches and critical security 
studies, on the contrary, are strongly oriented towards 
understanding how policy changes because of the 
migration/asylum-nexus. While writings on human 
security and radicalisation do take into consideration 
individual, people-oriented dynamics, they are 
nonetheless limited compared to structure- and policy-
change analyses. This signifies a failure to consider the 
agency of migrants and refugees alike in ‘resisting’ or 
‘perpetrating’ the security nexus, which on the contrary 
could be a more beneficial way for policy-makers 
seeking solutions to various security-related issues.
Finally, the ‘forced migration and displacement cycle’ 
is rarely (Koser and Cunningham 2017 being an 
exception) acknowledged as a useful analytical tool, 
leading to two consequences. While on the one hand the 
academic discussion on the migration/asylum-security 
nexus remains often conceptual, on the other it also 
means that most attention is placed to the space that it 
is most salient in political terms, which is the border. 
In addition, failing to address the ‘forced migration and 
displacement cycle’ as an analytical tool also reflects 
a lack of structure within the literature with many 
topics and areas either being over studied (e.g., border; 
Muslim immigration) or understudied (e.g., refugees; 
returned asylum-seekers).
This review highlights the continuous salience of 
migration and asylum in relation to security, the need to 
focus on refugees and asylum-seekers as active political 
actors, and the structural vulnerabilities in the forced 
migration and displacement cycle as an important 
factor influencing political action. Rather than talking 
about refugees and asylum-seekers as the threat, the 
focus should be on the conditions of displacement and 
forced migration that open the door to exploitation and 
increases the probability that some individuals will 
give their support to radical/extreme forms of politics 
and may shift to acts of terror. 
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 th
e 
U
K
 a
nd
 a
fte
r b
ei
ng
 p
ro
ce
ss
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
a 
m
ig
ra
nt
 c
en
tre
 in
 K
en
t, 
w
as
 fo
un
d 
a 
ho
m
e 
w
ith
 
a 
fo
ste
r f
am
ily
 in
 S
un
bu
ry
 o
n 
Th
am
es
. 
17
 –
 1
8 
A
ug
us
t 
Sp
ai
n
BB
C
A
t l
ea
st 
13
 p
eo
pl
e 
ki
lle
d 
an
d 
ab
ou
t 1
00
 in
ju
re
d 
on
 1
7 
A
ug
us
t w
he
n 
a 
va
n 
dr
ov
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
cr
ow
d 
of
 p
eo
pl
e 
in
 a
 p
op
ul
ar
 to
ur
ist
 d
ist
ric
t i
n 
Ba
rc
el
on
a,
 S
pa
in
. T
w
o 
su
sp
ec
ts 
w
er
e 
ar
re
ste
d 
an
d 
an
ot
he
r s
ho
t d
ea
d.
 Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
  i
ss
ue
d 
a 
sta
te
m
en
t c
la
im
in
g 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
.  
O
n 
A
ug
us
t 1
8t
h,
 in
 C
am
br
ils
, a
 c
oa
sta
l c
ity
 a
ro
un
d 
10
0 
ki
lo
m
et
er
s f
ro
m
 B
ar
ce
lo
na
, fi
ve
 a
tta
ck
er
s 
dr
ov
e 
an
 A
ud
i A
3 
in
to
 se
ve
ra
l p
ed
es
tri
an
s, 
ki
lli
ng
 o
ne
. P
ol
ic
e 
sh
ot
 d
ea
d 
th
re
e 
of
 th
e 
at
ta
ck
er
s, 
O
H
, H
A
 a
nd
 M
O
.
9 
A
ug
us
t
Fr
an
ce
BB
C
H
B,
 a
 3
6-
ye
ar
-o
ld
 A
lg
er
ia
n 
ra
m
m
ed
 a
 B
M
W
 c
ar
 in
to
 a
 g
ro
up
 o
f s
ol
di
er
s i
n 
a 
Pa
ris
ia
n 
su
bu
rb
, 
in
ju
rin
g 
six
.
A
ug
us
t
Fr
an
ce
Re
ut
er
s
A
 y
ou
ng
 m
an
 tr
ie
d 
to
 fo
rc
e 
hi
s w
ay
 in
to
 th
e 
Ei
ffe
l T
ow
er
 w
ith
 a
 k
ni
fe
, s
ho
ut
in
g 
‘A
lla
hu
 A
kb
ar
’ 
(G
od
 is
 G
re
at
es
t).
 A
 so
ur
ce
 sa
id
 h
e 
to
ld
 in
ve
sti
ga
to
rs
 h
e 
w
an
te
d 
to
 k
ill
 a
 so
ld
ie
r. 
Th
e 
as
sa
ila
nt
 
is 
be
lie
ve
d 
to
 b
e 
a 
Fr
en
ch
 n
at
io
na
l b
or
n 
in
 M
au
rit
an
ia
 in
 1
99
8.
28
 Ju
ly
G
er
m
an
y
BB
C
M
an
 sh
ou
tin
g 
‘A
lla
hu
 A
kb
ar
’ s
ta
bb
ed
 to
 d
ea
th
 o
ne
 p
er
so
n 
an
d 
w
ou
nd
ed
 si
x 
ot
he
rs
 in
 a
 
su
pe
rm
ar
ke
t i
n 
H
am
bu
rg
. T
he
 a
tta
ck
er
, b
or
n 
in
 th
e 
UA
E,
 w
as
 o
ve
rp
ow
er
ed
 b
y 
pa
ss
er
s-
by
 a
nd
 
ar
re
ste
d.
 O
la
f S
ch
ol
z,
 th
e 
m
ay
or
 o
f H
am
bu
rg
, s
ai
d 
th
e 
at
ta
ck
 h
ad
 b
ee
n 
m
ot
iv
at
ed
 b
y 
‘h
at
e’
 
an
d 
ad
de
d 
th
at
 th
e 
su
sp
ec
te
d 
at
ta
ck
er
 w
as
 a
 fa
ile
d 
as
yl
um
 se
ek
er
 w
ho
se
 d
ep
or
ta
tio
n 
ha
d 
be
en
 
bl
oc
ke
d 
be
ca
us
e 
he
 la
ck
ed
 id
en
tit
y 
pa
pe
rs
.
6 
Ju
ne
Fr
an
ce
Re
ut
er
s
Fr
en
ch
 p
ol
ic
e 
sh
ot
 a
 m
an
 w
ho
 a
tta
ck
ed
 a
n 
offi
ce
r w
ith
 a
 h
am
m
er
 o
ut
sid
e 
th
e 
N
ot
re
-D
am
e 
ca
th
ed
ra
l i
n 
Pa
ris
.  
A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
Fr
en
ch
 In
te
rio
r M
in
ist
er
, t
he
 a
ss
ai
la
nt
 c
ar
rie
d 
ki
tc
he
n 
kn
iv
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
id
en
tit
y 
ca
rd
 o
f a
n 
A
lg
er
ia
n 
stu
de
nt
.
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3 
Ju
ne
U
K
BB
C
Sk
y
K
B,
 R
R 
an
d 
Y
Z 
dr
ov
e 
in
to
 p
ed
es
tri
an
s o
n 
Lo
nd
on
 B
rid
ge
 th
en
 st
ab
be
d 
pe
op
le
 in
 B
or
ou
gh
 
M
ar
ke
t n
ea
rb
y,
 k
ill
in
g 
ei
gh
t p
eo
pl
e 
an
d 
in
ju
rin
g 
48
. A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 S
ky
 so
ur
ce
s, 
on
e 
m
an
 w
as
 a
 
27
-y
ea
r-o
ld
 o
f P
ak
ist
an
i o
rig
in
 w
ith
 B
rit
ish
 c
iti
ze
ns
hi
p 
w
ho
se
 p
ar
en
ts 
w
er
e 
as
yl
um
 se
ek
er
s a
nd
 
w
as
 m
ar
rie
d 
w
ith
 2
 ch
ild
re
n.
 T
he
 se
co
nd
 cl
ai
m
ed
 to
 b
e 
M
or
oc
ca
n-
Li
by
an
 a
nd
 h
el
d 
an
 Ir
ish
 ID
 
do
cu
m
en
t. 
A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
BB
C,
 h
e 
ar
riv
ed
 in
 th
e 
U
K
 in
 2
00
6 
an
d 
ap
pl
ie
d 
fo
r a
sy
lu
m
 b
ut
 h
is 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
w
as
 re
je
ct
ed
 in
 2
00
9.
  T
he
 th
ird
 w
as
 a
n 
Ita
lia
n 
na
tio
na
l, 
bo
rn
 in
 M
or
oc
co
.
Ju
ne
U
K
Co
ur
t R
ec
or
d
BB
C
H
am
as
al
ih
, a
n 
Ira
qi
 K
ur
d 
w
ho
 cl
ai
m
ed
 a
sy
lu
m
 in
 2
00
2 
an
d 
be
ca
m
e 
a 
Br
iti
sh
 C
iti
ze
n 
in
 2
00
8 
an
d 
se
ttl
ed
 in
 B
irm
in
gh
am
, w
as
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 o
f b
ei
ng
 a
 m
em
be
r o
f I
sla
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
.  
Th
e 
O
ld
 
Ba
ile
y 
he
ar
d 
he
 h
ad
 c
o-
or
di
na
te
d 
IS
 sy
m
pa
th
ise
rs
 in
 th
e 
U
K
22
 M
ay
U
K
BB
C
22
-y
ea
r-o
ld
 B
rit
ish
 M
us
lim
 S
R
A
 th
e 
so
n 
of
 L
ib
ya
n 
re
fu
ge
e 
pa
re
nt
s w
ho
 so
ug
ht
 a
sy
lu
m
 
af
te
r fl
ee
in
g 
th
e 
G
ad
ha
ffi
 re
gi
m
e,
 d
et
on
at
ed
 a
 sh
ra
pn
el
-la
de
n 
ho
m
em
ad
e 
bo
m
b 
at
 th
e 
ex
it 
of
 
M
an
ch
es
te
r A
re
na
 in
 M
an
ch
es
te
r, 
En
gl
an
d,
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
a 
co
nc
er
t b
y 
A
m
er
ic
an
 si
ng
er
 A
ria
na
 
G
ra
nd
e.
 T
w
en
ty
-th
re
e 
ad
ul
ts 
an
d 
ch
ild
re
n 
w
er
e 
ki
lle
d,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
A
be
di
, a
nd
 2
50
 w
er
e 
in
ju
re
d.
 
A
us
tri
a
Co
ur
t R
ec
or
d
BB
C
Ju
dg
m
en
t i
n 
A
us
tri
a.
 A
 S
yr
ia
n 
re
fu
ge
e,
 2
7,
 w
ho
 e
nt
er
ed
 A
us
tri
a 
in
 2
01
6 
w
as
 se
nt
en
ce
d 
to
 li
fe
 
im
pr
iso
nm
en
t i
n 
In
ns
br
uc
k.
 A
 c
ou
rt 
co
nv
ic
te
d 
hi
m
 o
f 2
0 
m
ur
de
rs
 o
f S
yr
ia
n 
so
ld
ie
rs
 in
 th
e 
Sy
ria
n 
ci
vi
l w
ar
 in
 2
01
3/
14
 in
 H
om
s.
A
pr
il
Fr
an
ce
BB
C
KC
 sh
ot
 d
ea
d 
a 
po
lic
em
an
 a
nd
 in
ju
re
d 
tw
o 
ot
he
r o
ffi
ce
rs
 o
n 
th
e 
Ch
am
ps
-E
ly
se
es
. T
he
 a
ss
ai
la
nt
 
w
as
 sh
ot
 d
ea
d 
by
 se
cu
rit
y 
fo
rc
es
.  
Th
e 
at
ta
ck
 w
as
 cl
ai
m
ed
 b
y 
Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
.
7 
A
pr
il
Sw
ed
en
BB
C
R
A
, a
 3
9 
ye
ar
-o
ld
 fr
om
 U
zb
ek
ist
an
 a
nd
 ‘f
ai
le
d 
as
yl
um
 se
ek
er
’ w
ho
 a
pp
lie
d 
fo
r r
es
id
en
cy
 in
 
20
14
, b
ut
 h
ad
 b
ee
n 
in
fo
rm
ed
 in
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
6 
th
at
 ‘h
e 
ha
d 
fo
ur
 w
ee
ks
 to
 le
av
e 
th
e 
co
un
try
’, 
dr
ov
e 
a 
tru
ck
 in
to
 p
ed
es
tri
an
s o
n 
D
ro
ttn
in
gg
at
an
 (Q
ue
en
 S
tre
et
), 
St
oc
kh
ol
m
, b
ef
or
e 
cr
as
hi
ng
 it
 
in
to
 a
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t s
to
re
. F
ou
r p
eo
pl
e 
di
ed
 in
 th
e 
at
ta
ck
 
A
pr
il
G
er
m
an
y
Re
ut
er
s
A
 1
6-
ye
ar
-o
ld
 S
yr
ia
n 
re
fu
ge
e 
w
as
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 in
 w
es
te
rn
 G
er
m
an
y 
fo
r p
la
nn
in
g 
a 
bo
m
b 
at
ta
ck
 
an
d 
se
nt
en
ce
d 
to
 tw
o 
ye
ar
s i
n 
a 
yo
ut
h 
pr
iso
n.
 T
he
 ju
dg
es
 in
 C
ol
og
ne
 sa
id
 th
e 
pl
ot
 w
as
 a
t a
 v
er
y 
ea
rly
 st
ag
e 
an
d 
di
d 
no
t y
et
 p
os
e 
an
y 
th
re
at
 to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
. 
22
 M
ar
ch
U
K
BB
C
K
M
, 5
2,
 st
ab
be
d 
a 
po
lic
em
an
 cl
os
e 
to
 th
e 
Br
iti
sh
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t i
n 
Lo
nd
on
 a
fte
r a
 c
ar
 p
lo
ug
he
d 
in
to
 p
ed
es
tri
an
s o
n 
ne
ar
by
 W
es
tm
in
ste
r B
rid
ge
. S
ix
 p
eo
pl
e 
di
ed
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
as
sa
ila
nt
 a
nd
 th
e 
po
lic
em
an
 h
e 
sta
bb
ed
, a
nd
 a
t l
ea
st 
20
 w
er
e 
in
ju
re
d 
in
 w
ha
t p
ol
ic
e 
ca
ll 
a 
‘m
ar
au
di
ng
 te
rr
or
ist
 
at
ta
ck
’. 
18
 M
ar
ch
Fr
an
ce
BB
C
ZB
B 
at
te
m
pt
ed
 to
 sn
at
ch
 a
 g
un
 fr
om
 a
 so
ld
ie
r o
n 
pa
tro
l a
t O
rly
 a
irp
or
t, 
in
 P
ar
is.
 T
he
 m
an
 w
ho
 
Fr
en
ch
 in
te
rio
r m
in
ist
ry
 sp
ok
es
m
an
 sa
id
 h
ad
 e
ar
lie
r fi
re
d 
a 
po
t s
ho
t a
t p
ol
ic
e 
du
rin
g 
an
 id
en
tit
y 
ch
ec
k 
be
fo
re
 fl
ee
in
g,
 w
as
 sh
ot
 d
ea
d 
in
 th
e 
O
rly
 in
ci
de
nt
 b
y 
ot
he
r m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 so
ld
ie
r’s
 
pa
tro
l u
ni
t. 
3 
Fe
br
ua
ry
Fr
an
ce
BB
C
A
R
H
 w
ie
ld
ed
 a
 m
ac
he
te
 a
nd
 sh
ou
te
d 
‘A
lla
hu
 A
kb
ar
’ (
G
od
 is
 g
re
at
es
t) 
as
 h
e 
at
ta
ck
ed
 so
ld
ie
rs
 
in
 a
 sh
op
pi
ng
 m
al
l i
n 
Pa
ris
. H
e 
w
as
 sh
ot
 a
nd
 se
rio
us
ly
 w
ou
nd
ed
 b
y 
so
ld
ie
rs
. S
ec
ur
ity
 so
ur
ce
s 
in
 C
ai
ro
 sa
id
 th
e 
m
an
 h
el
d 
Eg
yp
tia
n 
id
en
tit
y 
pa
pe
rs
 a
nd
 a
rr
iv
ed
 in
 F
ra
nc
e 
in
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
. T
he
 
m
an
 w
as
 b
or
n 
in
 D
ak
ah
lia
, a
 p
ro
vi
nc
e 
no
rth
ea
st 
of
 C
ai
ro
. 
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10
 F
eb
ru
ar
y
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C
Fi
ve
 m
en
 w
er
e 
se
nt
en
ce
d 
fo
r m
ak
in
g 
sp
ee
ch
es
 e
nc
ou
ra
gi
ng
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
. 
M
A
, Y
B 
an
d 
R
K
, a
ll 
fro
m
 L
ut
on
, g
av
e 
sp
ee
ch
es
 in
 th
e 
to
w
n 
an
d 
w
er
e 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
lo
ca
l 
br
an
ch
 o
f t
he
 p
ro
sc
rib
ed
 ex
tre
m
ist
 g
ro
up
 A
l-M
uh
aj
iro
un
. Z
R,
 fr
om
 L
ut
on
, a
nd
 M
SC
, f
ro
m
 
M
ai
de
nh
ea
d,
 w
er
e 
co
nv
ic
te
d 
of
 si
m
ila
r o
ffe
nc
es
 a
fte
r a
 re
tri
al
 in
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
. 
2 
Fe
br
ua
ry
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C
RC
, 2
8,
 w
ho
 p
la
nn
ed
 to
 tr
av
el
 to
 th
e 
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
 to
 fi
gh
t w
ith
 A
bu
 S
ay
ya
f, 
a 
ba
nn
ed
 te
rr
or
ist
 
gr
ou
p,
 w
as
 fo
un
d 
gu
ilt
y 
of
 p
re
pa
ra
tio
n 
of
 a
ct
s o
f t
er
ro
ris
m
 a
nd
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
.
Ja
nu
ar
y
U
K
BB
C
A
M
H
, 2
7,
 a
nd
 S
H
A
Z,
 b
ot
h 
K
ur
di
sh
 Ir
aq
i r
ef
ug
ee
s w
ho
 tr
ie
d 
to
 re
tu
rn
 to
 h
is 
ho
m
e 
co
un
try
 a
nd
 
jo
in
 Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
, w
er
e 
ja
ile
d 
fo
r s
ev
en
 y
ea
rs
 in
 th
e 
U
K
20
16
19
 D
ec
em
be
r
G
er
m
an
y
BB
C
A
A
, a
 T
un
isi
an
 ‘f
ai
le
d 
as
yl
um
 se
ek
er
’ d
ro
ve
 a
 lo
rr
y 
in
to
 a
 c
ro
w
de
d 
Ch
ris
tm
as
 m
ar
ke
t i
n 
ce
nt
ra
l B
er
lin
, k
ill
in
g 
12
 p
eo
pl
e 
an
d 
in
ju
rin
g 
48
. G
er
m
an
 C
ha
nc
el
lo
r s
ai
d 
th
e 
au
th
or
iti
es
 w
er
e 
as
su
m
in
g 
it 
w
as
 a
 te
rr
or
ist
 a
tta
ck
. 
12
 D
ec
em
be
r
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C
ZB
, 2
6,
 a
nd
 M
A
A
, 2
7,
 w
er
e 
ja
ile
d 
on
 th
at
 d
ay
 a
t K
in
gs
to
n 
Cr
ow
n 
Co
ur
t f
or
 p
re
pa
ra
tio
n 
of
 a
ct
s 
of
 te
rr
or
ism
. M
A
A
 w
ith
dr
ew
 o
ve
r £
3,
00
0 
an
d 
ga
ve
 th
e 
m
on
ey
 to
 M
A
, a
lso
 k
no
w
n 
as
 th
e 
‘m
an
 
in
 th
e 
ha
t’,
 a
 su
sp
ec
t l
in
ke
d 
to
 th
e 
Br
us
se
ls 
te
rr
or
 a
tta
ck
 in
 M
ar
ch
 2
01
6.
 
6 
Se
pt
em
be
r
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C
AC
 a
nd
 M
BR
 (b
ot
h 
U
K
 n
at
io
na
ls)
 w
er
e 
ea
ch
 se
nt
en
ce
d 
to
 a
 to
ta
l o
f fi
ve
 y
ea
rs
 a
nd
 si
x 
m
on
th
s 
im
pr
iso
nm
en
t f
or
 e
nc
ou
ra
gi
ng
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 Is
al
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
 in
 a
 se
rie
s o
f v
id
eo
s t
he
y 
br
oa
dc
as
te
d 
on
lin
e.
26
 Ju
ly
Fr
an
ce
he
nr
yj
ac
ks
on
so
ci
et
y.o
rg
A
K
 a
nd
 A
P 
ki
lle
d 
a 
pr
ie
st 
w
ith
 a
 b
la
de
 a
nd
 se
rio
us
ly
 w
ou
nd
ed
 a
no
th
er
 h
os
ta
ge
 in
 a
 ch
ur
ch
 in
 
no
rth
er
n 
Fr
an
ce
 b
ef
or
e 
be
in
g 
sh
ot
 d
ea
d 
by
 F
re
nc
h 
po
lic
e.
 F
re
nc
h 
Pr
es
id
en
t F
ra
nc
oi
s H
ol
la
nd
e 
sa
id
 th
e 
tw
o 
ho
sta
ge
-ta
ke
rs
 h
ad
 p
le
dg
ed
 a
lle
gi
an
ce
 to
 Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
. 
24
 Ju
ly
G
er
m
an
y
BB
C
M
D
, a
 S
yr
ia
n 
na
tio
na
l, 
w
ou
nd
ed
 1
5 
pe
op
le
 w
he
n 
he
 b
le
w
 h
im
se
lf 
up
 o
ut
sid
e 
a 
m
us
ic
 fe
sti
va
l i
n 
A
ns
ba
ch
 in
 so
ut
he
rn
 G
er
m
an
y. 
Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
 cl
ai
m
ed
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 fo
r t
he
 a
tta
ck
. T
he
 
27
-y
ea
r-o
ld
 a
rr
iv
ed
 in
 G
er
m
an
y 
tw
o 
ye
ar
s e
ar
lie
r a
nd
 cl
ai
m
ed
 a
sy
lu
m
. H
e 
ha
d 
be
en
 in
 tr
ou
bl
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
po
lic
e 
re
pe
at
ed
ly
 fo
r d
ru
g-
ta
ki
ng
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 o
ffe
nc
es
 a
nd
 h
ad
 fa
ce
d 
de
po
rta
tio
n 
to
 
Bu
lg
ar
ia
. 
18
 Ju
ly
G
er
m
an
y
BB
C
M
R,
 a
 1
7-
ye
ar
-o
ld
 A
fg
ha
n 
re
fu
ge
e,
 w
ie
ld
in
g 
an
 a
xe
 a
nd
 a
 k
ni
fe
, a
tta
ck
ed
 p
as
se
ng
er
s o
n 
a 
tra
in
 
in
 so
ut
he
rn
 G
er
m
an
y,
 se
ve
re
ly
 w
ou
nd
in
g 
fo
ur
, b
ef
or
e 
be
in
g 
sh
ot
 d
ea
d 
by
 p
ol
ic
e.
 Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/
D
ae
sh
 cl
ai
m
ed
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 fo
r t
he
 a
tta
ck
. 
14
 Ju
ly
Fr
an
ce
CN
N
M
L-
B 
dr
ov
e 
a 
he
av
y 
tru
ck
 in
to
 a
 c
ro
w
d 
ce
le
br
at
in
g 
Ba
sti
lle
 D
ay
 in
 N
ic
e,
 k
ill
in
g 
86
 p
eo
pl
e 
an
d 
in
ju
rin
g 
sc
or
es
 m
or
e 
in
 a
n 
at
ta
ck
 cl
ai
m
ed
 b
y 
Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
. T
he
 a
tta
ck
er
 is
 a
 T
un
isi
an
-
bo
rn
 F
re
nc
hm
an
. 
14
 Ju
ne
Fr
an
ce
CN
N
LA
, a
 F
re
nc
hm
an
 o
f M
or
oc
ca
n 
or
ig
in
, s
ta
bb
ed
 a
 p
ol
ic
e 
co
m
m
an
de
r t
o 
de
at
h 
ou
tsi
de
 h
is 
ho
m
e 
in
 a
 P
ar
is 
su
bu
rb
 a
nd
 k
ill
ed
 h
is 
pa
rtn
er
, w
ho
 a
lso
 w
or
ke
d 
fo
r t
he
 p
ol
ic
e.
 T
he
 a
tta
ck
er
 to
ld
 
po
lic
e 
ne
go
tia
to
rs
 d
ur
in
g 
a 
sie
ge
 th
at
 h
e 
w
as
 a
ns
w
er
in
g 
an
 a
pp
ea
l b
y 
Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
.
11
 M
ay
U
K
Th
e 
G
ua
rd
ia
n
A
A
, 2
3,
 w
ho
 m
ov
ed
 to
 th
e 
U
K
 w
ith
 h
is 
fa
m
ily
 a
s r
ef
ug
ee
s i
n 
19
93
, w
as
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 o
f t
er
ro
r 
off
en
ce
s a
fte
r h
el
pi
ng
 a
 R
A
F 
ve
te
ra
n 
w
ho
 c
on
ve
rte
d 
to
 Is
la
m
 tr
y 
to
 jo
in
 ji
ha
di
s i
n 
Sy
ria
.
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22
 A
pr
il
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C
Ta
rik
 H
as
sa
ne
, a
ge
d 
22
, a
nd
 S
uh
ai
b 
M
aj
ee
d,
 2
1 
‘(b
ot
h 
Br
iti
sh
 c
iti
ze
ns
), 
w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
gu
ilt
y 
of
 
co
ns
pi
ra
cy
 to
 m
ur
de
r a
nd
 p
re
pa
ra
tio
n 
of
 te
rr
or
ist
 a
ct
s. 
N
ya
ll 
H
am
le
tt,
 a
ge
d 
25
, a
nd
 N
at
ha
n 
Cu
ffy
, a
ge
d 
26
, w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
gu
ilt
y 
of
 p
os
se
ss
in
g 
or
 su
pp
ly
in
g 
th
e 
fir
ea
rm
 a
nd
 a
m
m
un
iti
on
 
th
at
 w
as
 to
 b
e 
us
ed
 in
 th
e 
te
rr
or
 p
lo
t. 
N
at
ha
n 
Cu
ffy
 a
lso
 p
le
ad
ed
 g
ui
lty
 to
 p
os
se
ss
in
g 
ot
he
r 
fir
ea
rm
s t
ha
t w
er
e 
re
co
ve
re
d 
fro
m
 a
n 
ad
dr
es
s l
in
ke
d 
to
 h
im
. H
as
sa
ne
 a
nd
 M
aj
ee
d 
w
er
e 
gi
ve
n 
lif
e 
se
nt
en
ce
s.
1 
A
pr
il
U
K
 
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C
Ju
ne
ad
 K
ha
n,
 a
ge
d 
25
, a
nd
 S
ha
zi
b 
K
ha
n,
 a
ge
d 
23
 (b
ot
h 
be
lie
ve
d 
to
 h
av
e 
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
i 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
s)
, w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
gu
ilt
y 
of
 p
la
nn
in
g 
to
 tr
av
el
 to
 S
yr
ia
 to
 jo
in
 Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
 a
nd
 
fig
ht
. J
un
ea
d 
K
ha
n 
w
as
 a
lso
 fo
un
d 
gu
ilt
y 
of
 p
re
pa
rin
g 
an
 a
ct
 o
r a
ct
s o
f t
er
ro
ris
m
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
U
K
. J
un
ea
d 
K
ha
n 
w
as
 g
iv
en
 a
 li
fe
 se
nt
en
ce
 a
nd
 S
ha
zi
b,
 e
ig
ht
 y
ea
rs
.
22
 M
ar
ch
Be
lg
iu
m
BB
C
Ia
l-B
, K
al
-B
 a
nd
 N
L,
 th
re
e 
Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
 su
ic
id
e 
bo
m
be
rs
, a
ll 
Be
lg
ia
n 
na
tio
na
ls,
 b
le
w
 
th
em
se
lv
es
 u
p 
at
 B
ru
ss
el
s a
irp
or
t a
nd
 in
 a
 m
et
ro
 tr
ai
n 
in
 th
e 
Be
lg
ia
n 
ca
pi
ta
l, 
ki
lli
ng
 3
2 
pe
op
le
. 
Po
lic
e 
fo
un
d 
lin
ks
 w
ith
 th
e 
N
ov
em
be
r a
tta
ck
s i
n 
Pa
ris
. 
7 
Ja
nu
ar
y
Fr
an
ce
BB
C
TB
, b
or
n 
in
 T
un
isi
a,
 w
as
 sh
ot
 d
ea
d 
by
 p
ol
ic
e 
as
 h
e 
w
ie
ld
ed
 a
 k
ni
fe
 a
nd
 a
tte
m
pt
ed
 to
 st
ab
 
pe
op
le
 o
ut
sid
e 
a 
Pa
ris
 m
et
ro
 st
at
io
n.
 
20
15
29
 D
ec
em
be
r
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C
M
oh
am
m
ed
 R
eh
m
an
, 2
5,
 a
nd
 S
an
a 
A
hm
ed
 K
ha
n,
 2
4,
 fr
om
 R
ea
di
ng
 w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
gu
ilt
y 
of
 
pl
ot
tin
g 
to
 c
ar
ry
 o
ut
 a
 m
aj
or
 te
rr
or
ist
 a
tta
ck
 a
t a
 W
es
tfi
el
d 
sh
op
pi
ng
 c
en
tre
 in
 L
on
do
n 
or
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
Lo
nd
on
 u
nd
er
gr
ou
nd
.  
Bo
th
 w
er
e 
gi
ve
n 
lif
e 
se
nt
en
ce
s.
15
 D
ec
em
be
r
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
Th
e 
G
ua
rd
ia
n
M
us
ta
fa
 A
bd
ul
la
h 
w
as
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 o
f 1
3 
te
rr
or
ism
 re
la
te
d 
off
en
ce
s a
fte
r t
er
ro
ris
t t
ra
in
in
g 
vi
de
os
 
w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 h
is 
po
ss
es
sio
n 
w
he
n 
he
 tr
av
el
le
d 
ba
ck
 to
 th
e 
U
K
 a
fte
r s
ix
 m
on
th
s i
n 
Sy
ria
.  
H
e 
w
as
 se
nt
en
ce
d 
to
 fo
ur
 a
nd
 a
 h
al
f y
ea
rs
’ i
m
pr
iso
nm
en
t. 
A
bd
ul
la
h 
to
ld
 p
ol
ic
e 
at
 th
e 
ai
rp
or
t t
ha
t 
he
 w
as
 b
or
n 
in
 th
e 
U
K
 o
f C
hr
ist
ia
n 
Ja
m
ai
ca
n 
pa
re
nt
ag
e 
bu
t c
on
ve
rte
d 
to
 Is
la
m
 a
ro
un
d 
20
00
 
an
d 
ha
d 
se
ve
ra
l w
iv
es
 u
nd
er
 Is
la
m
ic
 la
w.
5 
D
ec
em
be
r
U
K
BB
C
M
M
, S
om
al
i b
or
n,
 a
tta
ck
ed
 se
ve
ra
l p
eo
pl
e 
at
 a
 L
on
do
n 
un
de
rg
ro
un
d 
sta
tio
n 
an
d 
at
te
m
pt
ed
 to
 
cu
t o
ne
 v
ic
tim
’s 
th
ro
at
. H
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 a
 li
fe
 p
ris
on
 se
nt
en
ce
 fo
r t
he
 a
tta
ck
.
13
 N
ov
em
be
r
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C
Ya
hy
a 
Ra
sh
id
 (f
am
ily
 o
rig
in
al
ly
 fr
om
 S
om
al
ia
) w
as
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 o
n 
tw
o 
co
un
ts 
of
 p
re
pa
rin
g 
to
 
co
m
m
it 
ac
ts 
of
 te
rr
or
ism
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
a 
tri
al
 a
t W
oo
lw
ic
h 
Cr
ow
n 
Co
ur
t. 
H
e 
w
as
 ch
ar
ge
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
in
te
nt
io
n 
of
 tr
av
el
lin
g 
to
 S
yr
ia
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 jo
in
 Is
la
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
13
 N
ov
em
be
r
Fr
an
ce
BB
C
Pa
ris
 w
as
 ro
ck
ed
 b
y 
m
ul
tip
le
, n
ea
r s
im
ul
ta
ne
ou
s g
un
-a
nd
-b
om
b 
at
ta
ck
s o
n 
en
te
rta
in
m
en
t s
ite
s 
ar
ou
nd
 th
e 
ci
ty
, i
n 
w
hi
ch
 1
30
 p
eo
pl
e 
di
e 
an
d 
36
8 
w
er
e 
w
ou
nd
ed
. I
sla
m
ic
 S
ta
te
/D
ae
sh
 cl
ai
m
ed
 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
. 
27
 O
ct
ob
er
 
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C 
A
bd
ur
ra
ou
f E
sh
at
i, 
a 
Li
by
an
 n
at
io
na
l a
ge
d 
29
, w
as
 se
nt
en
ce
d 
fo
r t
er
ro
ris
m
 a
nd
 im
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
off
en
ce
s. 
Es
ha
ti 
re
ce
iv
ed
 a
 si
x-
ye
ar
 p
ris
on
 se
nt
en
ce
. D
oc
um
en
ts,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
in
vo
ic
es
 fo
r 
am
m
un
iti
on
 w
or
th
 $
28
.5
 m
ill
io
n 
an
d 
fa
lsi
fie
d 
do
cu
m
en
ts 
w
hi
ch
 h
ad
 b
ee
n 
pr
ov
id
ed
 to
 a
n 
im
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
tri
bu
na
l, 
w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
on
 h
is 
ph
on
e 
w
he
n 
he
 w
as
 a
rr
es
te
d 
in
 D
ov
er
. E
sh
at
i c
la
im
ed
 
to
 h
av
e 
en
te
re
d 
th
e 
U
K
 o
n 
a 
vi
sa
 in
 2
00
9 
an
d 
th
en
 to
 h
av
e 
so
ug
ht
 a
sy
lu
m
 in
 th
e 
U
K
.
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21
 O
ct
ob
er
 
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C
Tu
hi
n 
Sh
ah
en
sh
a,
 2
7,
 a
nd
 M
us
ta
ki
m
 Ja
na
m
, 2
3,
 b
ot
h 
Br
iti
sh
 c
iti
ze
ns
, w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
gu
ilt
y 
of
 
he
lp
in
g 
in
 th
e 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
of
 a
ct
s o
f t
er
ro
ris
m
. T
he
y 
he
lp
ed
 a
 n
um
be
r o
f m
en
 tr
av
el
 to
 S
yr
ia
 
an
d 
w
er
e 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
th
em
se
lv
es
 to
 tr
av
el
 to
 S
yr
ia
 to
 c
om
m
it 
te
rr
or
ist
 a
ct
s.
2 
O
ct
ob
er
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
A
 1
5 
ye
ar
-o
ld
 b
oy
 (
an
on
ym
ou
s 
du
e 
to
 h
is 
ag
e,
 n
at
io
na
lit
y 
no
t 
di
vu
lg
ed
) 
w
as
 s
en
te
nc
ed
 t
o 
de
te
nt
io
n 
fo
r l
ife
 fo
r h
is 
pa
rt 
in
 p
la
nn
in
g 
to
 a
tta
ck
 A
N
ZA
C 
D
ay
 p
ar
ad
e 
in
 A
us
tra
lia
.  
H
e 
ha
d 
ex
ch
an
ge
d 
ov
er
 3
00
0 
em
ai
l m
es
sa
ge
s w
ith
 fe
llo
w
 p
lo
tte
r i
n 
A
us
tra
lia
.
15
 S
ep
te
m
be
r
U
K
Cr
ow
n 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
Se
rv
ic
e
BB
C 
M
oh
am
m
ed
 N
ah
in
 A
hm
ed
 (b
or
n 
in
 B
an
gl
ad
es
h 
an
d 
m
ov
ed
 to
 U
K
 a
s a
 ch
ild
) a
nd
 Y
us
uf
 Z
ub
ai
r 
Sa
rw
ar
 (b
or
n 
in
 U
K
 o
f P
ak
ist
an
i d
es
ce
nt
) w
er
e 
co
nv
ic
te
d 
of
 te
rr
or
ist
 o
ffe
nc
es
 a
nd
 ja
ile
d 
fo
r 1
2 
ye
ar
s e
ac
h 
ha
vi
ng
 b
ee
n 
ar
re
ste
d 
on
 re
tu
rn
 fr
om
 a
 8
 m
on
th
 v
isi
t t
o 
Sy
ria
 w
he
re
 th
ey
 h
ad
 jo
in
ed
 
te
rr
or
ist
 g
ro
up
s i
n 
A
le
pp
o.
29
 Ju
ly
U
K
Th
e 
G
ua
rd
ia
n
BB
C
M
A
A
 w
as
 fo
un
d 
gu
ilt
y 
of
 a
tte
m
pt
in
g 
to
 a
cq
ui
re
 R
ic
in
 fr
om
 a
 b
la
ck
 m
ar
ke
t w
eb
sit
e.
 H
e 
w
as
 
se
nt
en
ce
d 
to
 e
ig
ht
 y
ea
rs
 im
pr
iso
nm
en
t.
26
 Ju
ne
Fr
an
ce
BB
C
YS
 k
ill
ed
 h
is 
bo
ss
 th
en
 a
tte
m
pt
ed
 to
 b
lo
w
 u
p 
a 
U
S 
ow
ne
d 
ch
em
ic
al
 fa
ct
or
y 
in
 L
yo
n.
 
19
 A
pr
il
Fr
an
ce
BB
C
SA
G
, 2
4,
 o
f A
lg
er
ia
n 
de
sc
en
t m
ur
de
re
d 
a 
yo
un
g 
Fr
en
ch
 w
om
an
 a
nd
 h
ad
 p
la
nn
ed
 to
 a
tta
ck
 
ch
ur
ch
es
 b
ut
 sh
ot
 h
im
se
lf 
an
d 
w
as
 a
rr
es
te
d 
by
 p
ol
ic
e.
14
 F
eb
ru
ar
y
D
en
m
ar
k
CN
N
OA
H
El
-H
, a
 2
2-
ye
ar
-o
ld
 m
an
, b
or
n 
in
 D
en
m
ar
k,
 to
 Jo
rd
an
ia
n-
Pa
le
sti
ni
an
 p
ar
en
ts,
 w
as
 th
e 
pe
rp
et
ra
to
r o
f t
hr
ee
 se
pa
ra
te
 sh
oo
tin
gs
 th
at
 o
cc
ur
re
d 
in
 C
op
en
ha
ge
n,
 D
en
m
ar
k.
 In
 to
ta
l, 
tw
o 
vi
ct
im
s a
nd
 E
l-H
us
se
in
 w
er
e 
ki
lle
d,
 w
hi
le
 fi
ve
 p
ol
ic
e 
offi
ce
rs
 w
er
e 
w
ou
nd
ed
.
3 
Fe
br
ua
ry
Fr
an
ce
BB
C
M
C 
at
ta
ck
ed
 th
re
e 
so
ld
ie
rs
 w
ith
 a
 k
ni
fe
 in
 N
ic
e.
 H
e 
w
as
 a
rr
es
te
d 
by
 p
ol
ic
e.
9 
Ja
nu
ar
y
Fr
an
ce
CN
N
AC
, k
ill
ed
 a
 p
ol
ic
ew
om
an
  o
n 
8 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
an
d 
to
ok
 h
os
ta
ge
s a
t a
 su
pe
rm
ar
ke
t o
n 
9 
Ja
nu
ar
y,
 
ki
lli
ng
 fo
ur
 b
ef
or
e 
po
lic
e 
sh
ot
 h
im
 d
ea
d.
7 
Ja
nu
ar
y
Fr
an
ce
BB
C
SK
 a
nd
 C
K
, t
w
o 
Is
la
m
ist
 m
ili
ta
nt
s, 
br
ok
e 
in
to
 a
n 
ed
ito
ria
l m
ee
tin
g 
of
 th
e 
sa
tir
ic
al
 w
ee
kl
y 
Ch
ar
lie
 H
eb
do
 o
n 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
7 
an
d 
ra
ke
d 
it 
w
ith
 b
ul
le
ts,
 k
ill
in
g 
12
.  
Th
e 
at
ta
ck
s p
ro
m
pt
ed
 a
 
w
or
ld
w
id
e 
so
lid
ar
ity
 m
ov
em
en
t w
ith
 th
e 
slo
ga
n 
‘J
e 
Su
is 
Ch
ar
lie
’. 
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